U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS

Y 4. F 76/1: B 65

U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia and the B...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF DOCUMENTS
RECEIVED

AUG 8 1994

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80–221 CC WASHINGTON : 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-044489-6

U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS

Y 4. F 76/1: B 65

U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia and the B...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
RECEIVED
AUG 8 1994
SUNY PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80-221 CC WASHINGTON : 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-044489-6

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Chief of Staff*
RICHARD J. GARON, *Minority Chief of Staff*

CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES

Amb. Vladimir Matic, Former Assistant Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2
Michael Djordjevich, immediate past president, Serbian Unity Congress of America and chairman and CEO, American Guaranty Corporation 4
Hon. Warren Zimmermann, last U.S. Ambassador to the former Yugoslavia and senior fellow, Rand Corporation 6
Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick, senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Leavy Professor of Government, Georgetown University 7
Edward J. Damich, president, National Federation of Croatian Americans and professor of law, George Mason University 8

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Michael Djordjevich 33
Edward J. Damich 37
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey 50
Croatian American Association 52

APPENDIXES

1. Letter to President Clinton from Bishop Anthony of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, April 20, 1994 55
2. Summary Report of Conversations with the Bosnian Serb leadership, Pale, March 19 and 20, 1994, by Michael Djordevich 57

U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Committee on Foreign Affairs meets today in open session to hear testimony from nongovernmental witnesses on U.S. policy toward Bosnia and the Balkans.

This hearing is another in a series of hearings held during this Congress by the committee and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on the subject of the former Yugoslavia.

Our witnesses this morning include the Honorable Warren Zimmermann, last U.S. Ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, now a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; the Honorable Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leavy Professor of Government at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the American enterprise Institute; Michael Djordjevich, chairman and CEO of Capitol Guaranty Corporation and immediate past President of the Serbian Unity Congress of America; Professor Edward J. Damich, president of the National Federation of Croatian Americans; and Vladimir Matic, former Assistant Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I understand that today's panel will present widely differing perspectives on U.S. policy, but that all points of view on the complex issue of the former Yugoslavia are, of course, not represented. It is not possible to do that with a single panel.

Written statements submitted to the committee this morning will, without objection, be made a part of the hearing record.

There is, of course, a context for today's hearing. Recent negotiations have ended the fighting between the Muslims and the Croatians in Bosnia. The problem before us now is ending the war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Government.

The committee seeks from the panel this morning policy advice on how to end this war and protect and promote the U.S. national interest. The witnesses know several of the key players in the Bosnian conflict personally, and it is my hope that this will add to the constructiveness of their testimony.

The policy questions before the committee this morning are: What steps should the United States, the European Union, NATO and the United Nations take to end this war? What steps should

the United States take to pressure the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia to end the war? What policy should the United States pursue toward the Bosnian Government?

The Chair would like to ask witnesses to summarize their opening statements. I intend to strictly enforce the 5-minute rule for opening statements. I know that is a short time, but we are anxious to get to members' questions, so I would urge you to make the central points that you want to make succinctly and briefly.

When the red light goes on, I would like to request you begin to conclude your statements so that we can maximize the time for questions and answers.

Let us start with you, Mr. Matic, and then we will move across the table from my left to right, if that is all right with the witnesses. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR MATIC, FORMER ASSISTANT FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. MATIC. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Congressmen, it is a privilege to be able to present the views here. I shall try to address briefly four issues crucial in my opinion for assessing the situation in Bosnia and prospects of peace.

Chairman HAMILTON. Let me suggest that you bring the microphone up very close. It is voice activated and you have to speak right into it. Thank you.

Mr. MATIC. I have been always against shouting, but I will try to keep my voice on the level.

I said I shall try to address briefly four issues crucial, in my opinion, for assessing the situation in Bosnia and prospects of peace.

First, what Bosnia really was, who are Bosnians and what remained of that after 2 years of war; second, the character of wars in former Yugoslavia; third, why have efforts of the international community to stop the bloodshed and achieve a negotiated settlement failed; and, fourth, what kind of solution in Bosnia could provide peace and stability in the region.

First, Bosnia and her population were put several centuries ago on a path of history which led them to create a distinctive and unique culture, a dialect of their own and a society based on three religions but one mentality. They all have been Bosnians and they all lost their country. More than 2 million lost their homes, too, and more than 200,000 lost their lives during the past 2 years.

Bosnia has been partitioned by the way of ethnic cleansing, the essence of all the conflicts there. Bosnians had to take sides one way or the other in a war engineered and conducted by their leaders who, in the quest for power, chose to form national states despite destruction, misery and death such an attempt inflicts upon all their citizens.

Second, several months ago Lord Owen began a lecture on Yugoslavia with the sentence, "To end a war you have to try and understand its origins." If we do that, we may understand why disintegration of Yugoslavia could not have been accomplished peacefully and why the war in Bosnia has been so terrifying and sanguinary.

It is the character of the war, not of peoples who fought, that made it atrocious.

The battles in former Yugoslavia were fought for formation of national states and their frontiers, not just for territories, but space without "alien" population.

Since it has been for more than 70 years a multiethnic, multiconfessional and multicultural country, it could not have been divided easily. Massive resettlement was required and there was no way to achieve that but through what became known as ethnic cleansing. Only the planners of these crimes were aware of what was coming and of time needed to accomplish it, and they kept creating illusions of progress toward peace and continued negotiations to be able to complete their job.

Third, the international community got involved in the Yugoslav crisis without a clear-cut policy and goal except to prevent and later to stop bloodshed and provide humanitarian aid. The latter must be recognized as successful because it enabled tens of thousands of Bosnians to survive. It relieved the suffering of people in other parts of Yugoslavia, too.

On the other hand, mediation efforts produced dozens of resolutions and hundreds of agreements, which were all later rejected, broken or disregarded by warring sides at their convenience. And it was easy, since every such act was followed by new negotiations and sometimes even additional concessions. Neither European Community and CSCE in the beginning, nor United Nations and NATO later, had experience or were equipped to deal with a post-cold war crisis of such magnitude. In addition to lack of consensus, misconceptions about the nature of the crisis made it possible for the lords of war to prevail.

Fourth, resolution of the crisis in Bosnia might become a model for addressing similar problems in the entire region of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union plagued with poverty and potentially aggressive ethnic nationalism. Along the way of negotiating the solution for Bosnia, certain principles will be established for dealing with issues of minorities and divided nations, and it will influence not only the future of Kosovo, but of Europe and fragile post-cold war relations.

Clearly, peace and stability in this region would serve the best interests of both peoples of former Yugoslavia and of their neighbors. This can be achieved only by eliminating potential sources of new conflicts, not by trying to sweep them under the carpet or worse yet, by accepting them as facts of life in the Balkans.

Real peace, not merely truce, means creating conditions for return of majority of more than 2 million refugees to their homes and international guaranties of their human and other rights. After all, Muslims and Serbs and Croats will have to continue living in the same piece of land together—mixed as in the past or next to each other, what their leaders have been trying to accomplish over the past few years.

Economic recovery, I would say in conclusion, in that region cannot be successful without mutual cooperation of newly created states as well as their cooperation with the rest of Europe. In the end, even the most extreme nationalists will have to accept what it takes to become, again, part of Europe. Democratization would

inevitably follow peace and economic prosperity since they create an environment unfit for totalitarian regimes of any kind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Matic. Mr. Djordjevich.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DJORDJEVICH, IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT, SERBIAN UNITY CONGRESS OF AMERICA AND CHAIRMAN AND CEO, AMERICAN GUARANTY CORPORATION

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the committee.

If the Bosnian problem is a problem from hell, as Secretary of State Christopher has aptly described, then the Balkan problem is indeed a catastrophe in the making. We still have a chance to prevent this catastrophe from happening, although time is running out.

Our Central Intelligence Agency made the prediction of the Yugoslav crisis about 18 months before it broke forth, yet we did little to prevent it from happening.

The principal blame for the Yugoslav tragedy must go to the Yugoslavs in general and to their political leaders in particular. It was these leaders who abused the latent nationalists forces in their respective republics in order to legitimize their monopoly of power. The leaders in the secessionist republics also succumbed to influences coming from the newly unified and resurgent Germany and certain Islamic states.

We, that is our Government, have also contributed substantially to the problem of hell. From the beginning of the Yugoslav tragedy our actions have been contradictory. For a while, we ardently supported the Helsinki Accords, especially the provisions of article III clause IV, which guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of participating states. Yet in summer of 1991, although we publicly tried to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia, we allowed German Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister Genscher to encourage Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia—a state which was signatory to the Helsinki Accords of 1975.

Soon thereafter we accepted the position of Germany and Austria that the multiethnic and multireligious Yugoslavia was an artificial entity which had to be dissolved, the Helsinki Accords notwithstanding.

Reversing our policy again, we began to insist that the small part of Yugoslavia called Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a multiethnic, multireligious population and a minority Muslim-led government, was a viable entity. We also recognized the right of the Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to secede from Yugoslavia. But we denied the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the right to remain in Yugoslavia.

With our hasty recognition of the break-away republics of former Yugoslavia, we forced one-third of the entire Serbian population in Yugoslavia to live in hostile states. Afraid to live in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are denied fully equal religious, civil, and cultural rights, as well as legal protection, these Serbs felt that they had no other choice but to defend their basic human and civil rights with arms. To this the international community

promptly reacted by declaring them the "aggressors" and even "invaders," who together with the Serbs in Yugoslavia had to be severely punished.

And punish the Serbs we did. But it was their children, their sick, their poor as well as their old people who came to feel the punishment of our sanctions most. Furthermore, we expelled the so-called "aggressive" Yugoslavia from the United Nations, while condoning the invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the regular army of Croatia. Finally, we participated in a campaign to demonize Serbia and the Serbs, a campaign that is evidently thoroughly planned and very well-financed and is being conducted on a worldwide scale.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that these policies and actions are not only self-contradictory, but also highly unprincipled. By all accounts, they are unbecoming of our great Nation and our long-standing democratic traditions.

By destabilizing Yugoslavia, we are destabilizing the Balkans, and if this process were to continue, the whole of Europe would also become destabilized. Thus far, the evidence suggests that we have been collaborating with Germany in forging a Croat-Muslim alliance. If successful, this alliance would ultimately lead to a weakened Serbia and Greece and, thus, open the way for Germany to realize her long-coveted goals: First, free access, by way of the Adriatic, to the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East and, second, virtual control over one of the most important international waterways, the Danube River.

The fuse, however, that would light the Balkan powder keg is a "greater Albania." We seem determined to create such a state by expanding Albania's current boundaries to include portions of the territories and peoples of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and northern Greece.

If our policymakers do indeed persist with this policy, then they will condemn this region of Europe, a region of immense geopolitical importance, to war and turmoil for a long time to come. Such a situation would lend itself eventually to military intervention by the Russians who are pro-Serbian.

The European Community would very likely split up over this issue and form itself into two blocs, one led by England and France and the other by Germany, a formation that has occurred twice before in this century.

If it is our goal, then, to keep the Balkans in turmoil, destabilize Europe, hasten the advent of a defiant and strong nationalist Russian state, support the establishment of a "Germanic Belt" from the Baltics to the Adriatic, create out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Greater Albania a bridgehead for expansion of Islam into Europe, then the policies we are pursuing are indeed on the right track.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Djordjevich, your time is up. Can you begin to wrap up your statement, please.

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. I am at the end, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

If that is not our goal, however, what steps can we take to prevent the war in former Yugoslavia from widening up? I will have that in verbal comments as we proceed. Thank you so much for the time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Djordjevich appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Chairman HAMILTON. We will look forward to that. We thank you.

And now, Ambassador Zimmermann, we are pleased to have you before the committee and you may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN ZIMMERMANN, LAST U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SENIOR FELLOW, RAND CORPORATION

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I proceed from the assumption that the United States does have significant interest in the Balkans and in Bosnia. We have, first of all, a geopolitical interest. Bosnia happens to fall on a traditional fault line that runs from Poland down to Albania.

We have three allies and many friends of countries who are neighbors of Bosnia and, therefore, I think geopolitically we are very much engaged.

Secondly, we have a global interest in what happens in Bosnia, whether we like it or not. Dictators from Haiti to North Korea are going to be watching our actions there to see if we can show the resolution that is called for. And, of course, Mr. Zhirinovsky, in Russia, is also going to be watching, as no doubt President Yeltsin will be.

Finally, we have a moral interest, and perhaps this is the greatest of all. This is a complicated issue, but what is not complicated is the moral aspect of it. We are watching aggression against a people whose only crime is to want to live in a multiracial society. As the most successful multiracial society in the world, I think the United States cannot stand back.

What can we do about it? Unfortunately, it is too late to resurrect a multiethnic Bosnia within the pre–1992 frontiers. But I think it is still not too late to preserve a viable space for those who want to live in a multiethnic environment and that would be as a rule of thumb perhaps a third for the Bosnian, the Muslim population, or—if the alliance with the Croatians survives, as I hope it will—about 50 percent, which would, of course, leave the Serbian aggressors with 50 percent, which is far more than they had when they began.

This is a limited objective and it seems to me we can pursue it. We must pursue it with limited means. I would be very much opposed to the use of ground forces in combat in Bosnia, but I think air power is required. It is not accidental that the partial successes of Sarajevo and Gorazde, where nobody today is being killed, were brought about by the credible threat of air power by NATO.

I think the United States should work for international acceptance of the use of air power against any Serbian military target in Bosnia and the United States must be consistent in this. Our approach so far has been episodic. I think we have to show stability and stamina and consistency. We should be prepared to threaten or use air strikes until it is clear that the Bosnian Serbs will cease their aggression and will make a decent peace.

As long as there is a hope for this, I would not favor lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, which has many downsides as well as some positive elements to it.

My bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is my strong view that there will be no negotiated agreement and, therefore, no end of the war in Bosnia without continued U.S. willingness to use air strikes there. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we are pleased to have you. You slipped in a little late. Do you want me to proceed to Professor Damich, or are you prepared?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. No, I am ready.

Chairman HAMILTON. You are ready.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, AND LEAVY PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I very much appreciate your permitting me to be here this morning.

Chairman HAMILTON. Bring the microphone up, would you, please, very close. Thank you.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I very much appreciate you permitting me to be here today. I am happy to speak to share with the committee my views about this subject, which I take to be enormously important to our country and to our allies and to our future.

Chairman HAMILTON. You may have a dead mike there. Let's try that. Bring it up close.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Is that better?

Chairman HAMILTON. I think that is better.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. It seems to me the United States has important interests, enormously important interests, urgent interests, in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in former Yugoslavia more generally. And I agree entirely with Ambassador Zimmermann that those interests are moral and strategic. And I would add that they also are legal because we have interests in a world of law.

Our moral interests are clear because we are humans and we share an interest in having a planet that is minimally hospitable to the human species. My colleague and friend Albert Wohlstetter has addressed the subject of "genocide by embargo," recently in the *Wall Street Journal*. Lady Thatcher has addressed the same subject in the *New York Times* recently. I think they have not exaggerated.

Genocide is obviously a moral issue of the most urgent importance and also a legal issue. It is a legal issue because there are conventions against genocide which we have signed.

There are also the Helsinki Act, the U.N. Charter, the Convention on Genocide.

Serbian aggression against Bosnia violates the U.N. Charter in two ways: First, the prohibitions against the use of force and against aggression; and, second, the Serbian aggression has led others, including us, to violate the U.N. Charter's recognition of the right of self-defense and collective self-defense. This right of collective self-defense and self-defense, article 51, is recognized in the

charter. It is clearly being violated by the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia. I think that is very serious.

I think we should lift the arms embargo. I also believe that we should provide, if necessary, air strikes—temporarily—to even the playing field in order to undo the imbalance created by the arms embargo.

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, in addition to destroying a people and law, the strategic consequences of failing to lift the arms embargo and even the playing field will be disastrous for NATO and for the future of collective security in Central Europe. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

We will conclude with Professor Damich.

Mr. DAMICH. Damich, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Damich.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. DAMICH, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF CROATIAN AMERICANS AND PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Mr. DAMICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to express the views of the Croatian-American community. I am Edward J. Damich, president of the National Federation of Croatian Americans and professor of law at George Mason University.

The U.S. policy regarding the former Yugoslavia as that of the international community, has been ineffectual at best. It has bounced between pusillanimous internationalism and narrow isolationism.

The keys to an effective U.S. policy regarding the former Yugoslavia are clarity and resolve. Clarity requires jettisoning the many myths that have created a fog around this problem. Instead, the following 11 truths should be kept in mind:

They are only one-sentence truths and I will be open to questions about them when I finish.

Number 1: The former Yugoslavia was characterized by Serbian hegemony. It was no Balkan Switzerland. We should not regret its passing.

Number 2: Serbia—not Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Germany—was responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia proposed a confederation solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia, which was rejected by Mr. Milosevic. German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia came after the invasion by the Serbian Army.

Number 3: Alleged mistreatment of the Serbian minority in other republics was only a pretext to create a great Serbia by force. Serbia has compelling economic reasons to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and to seize the Croatian regions of Dalmatia and Slavonia.

Number 4: Painting the Croats, Muslims and Serbs as constantly warring primitives is inaccurate and racist.

Number 5: The areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied by the Serbs are not ethnically homogeneous.

Number 6: The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is more precisely understood as the defense of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina by its legitimate, multiethnic government against an attempt by Serbia, through its Bosnian Serb surrogates, to annex all or part of it.

Number 7: Serbia's systematic policy of conquest and ethnic cleansing has no equal on the Croatian and Bosnian side.

Number 8: Neither the Croatian Government nor the Croatian people is fascist.

Number 9: The borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are based on historical and ethnic realities.

Number 10: Neither Croatia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina has asked for massive foreign ground troops.

Number 11: The situation in the former Yugoslavia is distinguishable from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. It is similar to Kuwait.

Let me elaborate briefly on that point: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have internationally recognized borders, and they are both full-fledged members of the United Nations. Serbia has violated these borders using its own troops and those of its surrogates. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda.

Both Croatia and Bosnia have functioning democratically elected governments. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda. Given limited military support, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are capable of liberating their territories. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti or Rwanda.

Currently, U.S. policy seeks to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table by discouraging through military force further conquests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and by offering the lifting of economic sanctions on Serbia. In the best case, Croatia will get back its occupied territories and 50 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be annexed to Serbia. Even the best case scenario is morally bankrupt because it ratifies aggression and ethnic cleansing.

To achieve a just solution and therefore a lasting peace, the international community must provide Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the means to vindicate their international borders. The international community must lift the arms embargo against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and provide the necessary air support to level the playing field.

As has been proved time and time again, the only thing the Serbs understand is the credible threat of force. Regrettably, this is the only way to bring a lasting peace to the region. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Damich appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much. Thanks to each of you. I understand that several of you have additions to your statement. They, of course, will be entered into the record.

We will begin now with questions from members.

I want to try to enforce the 5-minute rule with respect to members as we have with respect to the witnesses. If members have additional questions we will, of course, have a second round.

Mr. Lantos.

FAILED BOSNIA POLICY

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome all five of our distinguished witnesses.

We are dealing with probably one of the most important developments of the post-cold war world and we are dealing with a pro-

found and penetrating failure of Western leadership. When the history books will be written from the vantage point of the year 2050, this debacle will go down in the history books as one of the most serious instances of the collapse of Western leadership, both in Europe and in this country.

It is very important to look back, not to fix the blame, but to learn the lessons. It is clear to me that the prime responsibility rests with the great European powers. They had all the capability, militarily and otherwise, to prevent this nightmare from unfolding with over 200,000 dead, a million and a half refugees, and the destruction of a viable multiethnic, multiracial, multireligious society.

And I say this without a touch of partisanship. The secondary responsibility clearly rests with the Bush administration, because at the time that that administration was in office, there were still good solutions. By the time the Clinton administration came to power on January 20, 1993, there were no good solutions.

I am not suggesting that the Clinton administration handled this crisis well. It did not. But I think historic accuracy compels all of us to recognize that the good solutions which were available 2 years ago are no longer available. The best solution now is a disaster from every point of view.

A credible threat of force by NATO would have been sufficient to prevent all of this from unfolding. For two generations, the mighty Soviet Union and nuclear superpower, with vast conventional capabilities, was deterred from moving a single millimeter in Europe and the credible threat of force by NATO would have deterred Milosevic from moving a single millimeter against his neighbors.

RESIGNATION OF WITNESS FROM DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Now, it is intriguing and this is going to be my only question on this round, Mr. Chairman, why one of our most distinguished senior diplomats, who has served this Nation with great distinction in many critical spots, including Moscow and Belgrade, chose to resign near the end of a most impressive diplomatic career over a policy dispute?

I realize, Ambassador Zimmermann, that some aspects of your decision you will choose to reserve for a later time, maybe for your memoirs, but I think you will add to your service to this Nation if you will tell this committee, to the maximum extent you feel you can, why you were forced to resign; why you choose to resign; what were the policy recommendations you made to this administration which were rejected by this administration, which led to your decision to leave the diplomatic service.

EARLY EFFORTS TO PRESERVE YUGOSLAV UNITY

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. Congressman Lantos, I have no problem discussing the reasons for my resignation. Bosnia was, of course, a major part of those reasons. I was Ambassador to Belgrade during the Bush administration. I felt strongly, as did the President and the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, that the best hope lay in preserving the unity of Yugoslavia in a democratic format, and we fought to do that, unsuccessfully.

We predicted very early on, in 1989, then again in 1990, that if Yugoslavia fell apart it would fall apart with extreme violence. I

don't think any of us knew it would be as violent as it was; that these two terrible wars in Croatia and Bosnia would be as atrocious as they were, but we knew violence would come and therefore we sought to avoid it by trying to preserve a democratic and unity option in Yugoslavia.

RECOMMENDATION FOR AIR STRIKES AROUND SARAJEVO

I parted from the Bush administration during the Bosnian war after Yugoslavia had fallen apart. I felt that what was happening in Bosnia was clear aggression on the part of President Milosevic of Serbia and his Bosnian-Serb henchman, Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic had told me many times that there was no Serbian grievance in Bosnia; that the Serbs were not being mistreated in Bosnia. Nevertheless, you had this aggression.

I felt, and I first expressed this view in July of 1992, that it would be possible to halt the Serbian aggression through air strikes, and I concentrated on Sarajevo because, of course, it was the capital. It was a city that symbolized the multiethnic character of Bosnia, and what you were seeing was the shelling of a civilian population, which is a war crime. So I urged that there be air strikes against the artillery around Sarajevo.

Mr. LANTOS. You did this while you were Ambassador in Belgrade?

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. I had come back in May of 1982. So I had come back then. I came back in May of 1992, and at that point I was in charge of the Refugee Bureau of the State Department. It was in that capacity I made that recommendation. It was not followed.

I repeated that and similar recommendations in the Clinton administration, having the strong view that nothing was going to stop the aggression except a credible threat and, if necessary, use of force by NATO, with the United States leading. And for a long time, of course, those recommendations were also ignored.

I was not the only person to make them, of course. Four younger foreign service officers resigned over these issues during 1992 and 1993.

HUMANITARIAN EFFORT OBSCURED LACK OF POLICY

Finally, I had been in charge of the humanitarian effort for the U.S. Government, or I had been largely responsible for the humanitarian efforts for the U.S. Government in Bosnia. I felt as long as that could have some success that perhaps I could continue to be useful, although I did not agree with the policy of the administration. And indeed, I think the humanitarian effort has won some fairly major accomplishments, as Ambassador Matic has pointed out.

Unfortunately, I began to get the feeling toward the end of 1993 that the humanitarian effort was beginning to be seen as a cover for the lack of a genuine policy toward Bosnia, and I was, therefore, beginning to feel that I was myself complicit in that kind of cover. So I decided in early January of this year to write Secretary Christopher a letter and explain to him what my difficulties were with the policy.

I might add that as soon as he was free to see me—he was on a trip—as soon as he came back he did see me and he gave me a full opportunity to express my views, which I did. And the policy did change in February, of course, with the threatened air strikes over Sarajevo, which I was very glad to see.

I do feel, now that I am out of the government, that I, obviously, have no inhibitions about expressing my views. I think that the Clinton administration is now on the right track, but it is going to have to be much more consistent in its deployment of the air strike threat and of actually following through on air strikes, if necessary, because that, to me, is the only way an agreement can be reached.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Roth.

BOSNIA CONSTITUTES CASE OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we have heard here about the Bush administration's lack of action. I disagree with that, of course. Just what can be done, whether in Haiti, Somalia or Bosnia? What are we going to do, go in and take over a nation? What do we do next, administer it like the Romans did with their far-flung empire? Where does that lead us?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Congressman Roth, my view is that the problems in Bosnia are very substantially different than those in Somalia, for example, or Rwanda. Bosnia is a case of international aggression and a very clear-cut violation of the U.N. Charter, therefore.

There is no problem of nation building or state-building or self-government or capacity for self-government in Bosnia; Bosnians would be entirely capable of managing their own affairs were the reality of aggression to be removed.

I am very much opposed, Congressman Roth, to the idea that Americans should become involved in managing the affairs of other people and other nations. I think this carries its own serious dangers and that we should avoid it out of respect for the persons who deserve self-government and self-determination, in fact.

SERBIAN DOMINANCE NOT A FAIT ACCOMPLI

Mr. ROTH. Well, today we are focusing on Bosnia. There is a certain inevitability about what is happening in the Balkans, it seems to me. The Serbs are pushing ahead relentlessly and at this point no matter what the West does the Serbs are bound to dominate the Balkans; is that not right? And should we not face the realities and say, with this outcome at hand, that the West is not going to change the course of events in the Balkans?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. You know I don't think it is necessarily so that the Serbs are going to dominate the Balkans, Congressman. I believe that Croatia is established as a self-governing sovereign state; a member of the United Nations. Slovenia is established as a self-governing state. Macedonia is a sovereign self-governing state. And so I don't think it is clear that Serbia is going to dominate.

The worst possible outcome from our point of view could be the one I read about proposed in the newspaper today. A solution imposed by force in Bosnia and enforced by the United States and

Russia, in which we commit thousands of American forces to police an unjust agreement that was imposed by force. I think that is the worst possible agreement.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Smith.

SUPPORT FOR LIFTING ARMS EMBARGO

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome our very distinguished panel to the committee.

Just a couple of questions. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would agree with you that the arms embargo ought to be lifted. It was certainly a well-intentioned policy initiative years back when it was first initiated, but I can say with all candor, and I know Ambassador Zimmermann can back this up, because Frank Wolf and I did meet with him when we were in Belgrade, and it was very clear that when the breakup began of Yugoslavia, that the military might, the fire power of the former Yugoslavia fell almost exclusively into the hands of the Serbs.

And that in the case of Croatia, which was then under siege, and we saw it firsthand when Congressman Wolf and I went into Vukovar, which was under siege, and we were awestruck by men carrying AK–47s and some M–16's facing Migs, tanks and artillery, not to mention the snipers and others. It was a slaughter, it was not a war. And it became clear that this was going to be their modus operandi as they lay siege to city, after city, after city, and then Bosnia might be next.

I think we are at a moment of crisis in terms of leadership. As we all know, there is a very important debate going on over on the Senate side. Senator Claiborne Pell makes the point during the debates if we were to act unilaterally it would be in defiance of United Nations resolutions, international law and the consensus that once existed on this. And I was wondering, Madam Ambassador, whether or not you could say whether or not this is a necessary precedent or a dangerous precedent to defy the United Nations in this way, to stay locked into a wrong headed policy; or do we say wait a minute, it is wrong, we need to exert leadership and allow them, they being the Bosnian people, to defend themselves?

LIFTING EMBARGO CONSISTENT WITH U.N. CHARTER

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Congressman Smith, I think we say both. I think we say there was a lot wrong with this policy and there is still a lot wrong with it. I believe, with all due respect to Senator Pell, for whom I have a high regard, that it is not true that we would be violating any valid U.N. resolutions were we to lift the arms embargo.

I think it is quite clear that there is no Security Council action imposing an arms embargo on Bosnia. Bosnia was created after the two Security Council resolutions were passed. One Security Council resolution was passed and then reaffirmed. After that, Bosnia held a referendum in favor of self-determination and was admitted to the United Nations. We established diplomatic relations. Bosnia thereby acquired the normal rights of states under the U.N. Char-

ter, including those rights identified and recognized in article 51 of self-defense and collective self-defense.

There has been some misunderstanding about this. Some people have initially believed in the best faith that there was a legally valid arms embargo without noting the priority of the U.N. Charter and the rights that Bosnia acquired by virtue of being admitted to the United Nations.

QUEST FOR A GREATER SERBIA

Mr. SMITH. If I could ask one additional question, Mr. Chairman.

Last week, we had a hearing on the escalation in atrocities being committed against the people of Kosovo; that if you were to take the number of brutal beatings, arrests, kidnappings and torture for the first 3 months of 1994 and compare it to the first 3 months of 1993, it is a manyfold increase. It seems as if there has been a marked crackdown on people in that enclave.

How does the panel assess, and Ambassador Zimmermann and Kirkpatrick, or anyone else that might want to touch on this, how do you view this terrible turmoil spilling into Macedonia, Kosovo? Is that stoppable? Can we retard that in some way?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. May I reply?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. I believe that it is, to me, almost inconceivable that the imposition of a settlement, either by force by Serbia in Bosnia, or by outside powers, would lead to peace in the region. I believe that it will lead simply to further aggression.

We know that systematic repression bordering on ethnic cleansing has, in fact, already created hundreds of thousands of refugees, as I understand it, in and from Kosovo and that the problems of destabilization in Macedonia by Serbia are very real and growing and they threaten to destabilize that new sovereign state.

So I do not believe that Mr. Milosevic is going to stop in his quest for a greater Serbia except when he meets a force adequate to stop him and will adequately stop him. Unfortunately, I think that until then there will be no peace for Croatia or Slovenia or Macedonia or Kosovo.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, did you want to respond; and Professor Damich wants to respond.

SERBIAN POLICY IS LEADING TO GREATER ALBANIA

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. I just want to say I think Kosovo is and remains one of the most volatile problems in all of Europe. One sure way, I think, to have it boil over into serious violence would be for Milosevic and Karadzic to win a major victory in Bosnia, because that would show Western will had not been enough to stop them. And if we could not stop them in Bosnia, it would be much more difficult to stop them in Kosovo where they have very much more in terms of military and police presence on their side.

I would also say this. I was interested that Mr. Djordjevich said that U.S. policy is leading to a greater Albania. I would turn that totally around to argue that Serbian policy is leading to a greater Albania. The United States has continued to believe that Kosovo is a part of Serbia, but the degree to which the Albanian population of Kosovo is tyrannized by the Serbian authorities, I think one day

will, and probably should, lead to a reconsideration by the U.S. Government of whether Kosovo should belong to Serbia.

It is entirely in the hands of Serbian policy and of Mr. Milosevic's policy to determine whether he is going to continue to have the right to claim that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. If he continues to abuse the Albanian population, I think that the world will very quickly abandon this recognition of Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Then you will have a greater Albania and it will be entirely the product of Serbian policy.

Chairman HAMILTON. Professor Damich wanted to comment and then, Mr. Djordjevich.

MISTREATMENT OF ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO

Mr. DAMICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Croatian-American community supports the human and civil rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo. It is bitterly ironic, we feel, that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been attacked as mistreating their minorities when the only hard evidence which has been before the international community is the atrocious treatment of the Albanian majority in the Kosovo province. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Djordjevich.

OPPOSITION TO LIFTING THE EMBARGO

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. A couple of quick comments, Mr. Chairman.

In regard to the embargo, I submit to you and the honorable panel here that the embargo issue now is a strawman. I don't think it is a real issue. It was raised at this time for a specific purpose, and if the panel is interested, I can elaborate on this.

I am opposed to the embargo not because it will arm the Muslims—they already have the arms they need—but because it will be a message we do not like to give.

PROBLEM OF KOSOVO

In regard to Kosovo, I think I appreciate what Ambassador Zimmermann is saying; that Kosovo is indeed a part of Serbia and it is a part of legitimate Government of Serbia's business to control it. How it controls it, is subject to discussion. Obviously, it is a subject of a lot of controversy.

However, the problem with Kosovo is tied with Macedonia and Albania, there is no question about it. Kosovo Albanians do want to live in Albania, and that is how they feel; just like Krajina Serbs want to live in Serbia. And those are the problems we have to face in the Balkans. The Bosnian Serbs want to live with the Serbs and the Bosnian Croats do want to live with Croats. Those are facts of life, no matter how we want to package them. But this is the way it is.

Now, in regard to the Ambassador's comment about Serbia losing the right to Kosovo if it continues with its policies, I think if, for example, we apply the same yardsticks to Tibet or Kurdistan, I think China has no right really on the same basis to control Tibet; and not to mention about atrocities of Iraq, Turkey and others to Kurdistan. So if we are going to have principles, we have to go across the board and not pick up one area in the Balkans.

Chairman HAMILTON. Ambassador, you wanted to comment.

NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

Mr. MATIC. Yes. I just wanted to stress what, in a way, I indicated in my opening statement, that the problems in former Yugoslavia cannot be compartmentalized. One of them cannot be solved disregarding the problems in other parts of former Yugoslavia. And the same principle will apply to the entire region and even farther away to Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.

If the solution for Bosnia is sought based on the destruction of a multiethnic society, I believe it is going to haunt the region and those who make it for decades to come. Creating separate national states and recognizing this as a supreme right will certainly influence the developments in both Kosovo and maybe make Macedonia an unviable state because more than a third of its territory is inhabited densely by Albanians.

On the other hand, there is nothing wrong, I would say, in principle—there is nothing evil about changing borders. The evil in former Yugoslavia is in the way it is being done. So if one thinks that different nationalities should be basis of new states in the Balkans, it can only be achieved through an international conference and peacefully, and this is the only guaranty that it would be long-lasting and it would provide stability for that region in Europe.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ballenger.

CONSEQUENCES OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to pose—since several of you have mentioned the lifting of the arms embargo and recognizing the fact that arms are being smuggled, I guess, through Croatia into the Muslim enclave in a very ineffective amount, if the arms embargo were lifted, is there a personal opinion that it would actually—I know there are a lot of people that would love to send arms there, but is there a likelihood that such a thing would accomplish anything except to make the war larger and longer?

I don't know who I would like to ask that question of. Would the Ambassador—yes.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LIFTING EMBARGO

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. I would be glad to try to answer, Congressman. I have no problem in principle with lifting the arms embargo, and I am persuaded by Ambassador Kirkpatrick there really are no very strong legal impediments to doing it. But I think one has to look at what the consequences will be and what the difficulties would be.

I think in the current situation, it would not be enough just to lift the arms embargo. For the United States, we would have to also ensure that the Bosnians got arms, otherwise it would be a cynical move. That would mean we would have to ensure that arms were delivered to the Bosnians either overland from Croatia or by air. And both of those routes would be potentially subject to Serbian attack.

The Serbs have SAM missiles. They can shoot down airplanes, particularly large transport planes, and they control probably enough of Bosnia so they could mount a ground attack on an arms convoy. So that is the first thing I think you have to take account of.

The second is you have to guarantee to the Bosnians enough time to get trained on the arms, on the heavy arms, the tanks, the artillery, whatever. There would be every incentive, it would seem to me, for the Bosnian Serbs to mount a large scale attack on the Bosnians before they could get trained on the arms. And in order to deter that, it would seem to me the United States and NATO would have to probably undertake a series of air strikes to prevent the Serbs from launching such an attack.

So already the lifting of the arms embargo, if we did it in a way that was useful for the Bosnians, would involve a much greater commitment of U.S. power than the air strikes, which I recommend.

It also, I think, has to be borne in mind that lifting the arms embargo is certainly going to escalate the war. It will eliminate at least in the short-term any chance of a negotiated peace. And, of course, it will not give you any necessary guarantee that the Bosnians will end up the net gainers in an escalation of the war, because, of course, the Serbs can draw on the fifth largest, or what was the fifth largest army of Europe, the old Yugoslav Army.

So my own view is that for now, when I think the possibility of a negotiated agreement is quite close, an air strike approach is the way to get there. If that fails, then it does seem to me that we have to look at the more long-term and dangerous option, but nevertheless valid one, of lifting the arms embargo.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Djordjevich.

LIFTING EMBARGO WILL INTERRUPT PEACE PROCESS

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. I do agree that the arms embargo at this time would escalate the war. I also agree, from everything I know, that conditions for peace do exist at this moment. Lifting the arms embargo would be, I think, shortcutting those conditions and would be, at this point, I think, quite counterproductive.

In regard to arms embargo itself, let us be very clear about it. The Muslim side is well armed. And all the talk about poor defenseless Muslims is exaggerated to a great extent because by even German accounts the Muslim army now has over 80 tanks and 300 artillery weapons and all kinds of warmaking things. They are getting armed better every day. Arms are pouring into Yugoslavia. The embargo is nothing but a big piece of Swiss cheese—full of holes.

There is a line, merchant shipping line, from Rostock, Germany to Albania, that is smuggling arms on a regular basis. Arms are coming from Iran, Saudi Arabia, from everywhere. So by lifting the arms embargo, it is not we will help them get arms, they are getting them. But we are sending a message that the peace process, which is on the threshold of being completed, can be interrupted, and that is why I am very much opposed to arms embargo.

And I do agree with Ambassador Zimmermann's assessment, and that is my own observation, the Serbs could not wait 6 to 8 months

for the Muslim army to get trained and armed to wage the war. We would have bloodshed before we know it.

Chairman HAMILTON. Professor Damich.

LIFTING EMBARGO WILL LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

Mr. DAMICH. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. The arms embargo, as I stated, should be lifted against both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. As far as I am concerned, that is the only solution which is a just solution. The solution advocated by Ambassador Zimmermann is a solution, however, I must stress it results in 50 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even in the best case scenario, being allowed to be annexed to Serbia.

I think unless the solution is a just solution there will be no lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. At the very least, the victims of Serbian aggression should be allowed to defend themselves. I think in the short run, there will be an escalation of violence, as of course is the same thing with limited air strikes, but I think in the long run you will have a lasting peace.

Serbia is not an economic powerhouse. Slovenia and Croatia were the wealthiest republics in the former Yugoslavia. Serbia is drawing on its military and economic capital and it will soon be down to zero, and I think a determined opposition by Croatia and Bosnia, with the help of the United States, to level the playing field, and the United Nations, will bring the Serbs to the bargaining table. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Ambassador Kirkpatrick wanted to comment, and then Ambassador Matic.

BOSNIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Congressman. I would like to say only that I have been told by Slovenians and Croatians and Bosnians all, but especially Slovenians and Croatians, that Serbia, in undertaking its initial aggression against Slovenia, desisted quickly after it became clear that the Slovenians had arms with which to defend themselves. This apparently had not been expected but was, and when armed resistance developed they desisted and turned their attention to Croatia.

And when Croatia finally managed, with a great deal of difficulty and after much destruction to procure arms—in contravention of the arms embargo—the Serbs desisted in their attacks on Croatia and turned their attention to Bosnia. In Bosnia, the Serbian forces have paid a very low price or almost no price at all for the continued aggression in Bosnia.

And I believe that as in the Warsaw ghetto, human beings deserve not simply to be massacred, but have a right to defend themselves even if they are finally going to be overwhelmed. And if the Bosnians desire to defend themselves, I do not believe we should be obstacles to that self-defense. Americans are not cynical people, but it is cynical to deny Bosnians the right to self-defense.

Chairman HAMILTON. Ambassador Matic.

DANGERS OF RENEWED WAR IN BOSNIA

Mr. MATIC. I would just like not to repeat the arguments which have been used to draw attention to some additional dangers of a renewed war in Bosnia. It is not only new victims and further destruction and certainly not in smaller numbers than it has been during the past 2 years, but there is a great danger and probability, I would say, of an all out war on the part of Serbs and Serbia on one side and Muslims and Croats on the other. In such a war, the alliance and the agreements which were struck and signed here in Washington certainly would hold at least throughout the war. And Croatia, in a case of a renewed war in Bosnia, certainly could not be kept aside.

The only thing I would add is that it would be very difficult to contain this only to the region of these three states, if I may use that expression. Because probably some other people's minorities in that area would see it as an opportunity and certainly it would affect the interests of the neighboring states and of major powers.

Ever since the disintegration of Yugoslavia began, the warring parties, or the leadership of the republics in the beginning, while Yugoslavia existed, were doing their best in attempts to acquire foreign assistance, alliance and help from major powers in Europe and especially the United States and get them backing their wars.

YUGOSLAV CRISIS SELF-INDUCED

Certainly, the crisis in Yugoslavia was self-induced. By that I mean it was contemplated, started and conducted by the leaderships of Yugoslav Republics and Yugoslav nations. But a number of misunderstandings and misconceptions on the part of outside powers helped them achieve what they wanted.

In regard to secession of Slovenia, I would add a heretical position that Serbian nationalists needed secession of Slovenia because otherwise they could not have started what they wanted. They needed proclamation of secession in Croatia in order to incorporate parts inhabited by Serbs. And Croatia's nationalistic leadership needed the war in Croatia in order to get sympathies, support and recognition for their country.

If you look at the crisis in Yugoslavia, in terms of black and white and good and bad, I am afraid there is no way to understand it. There are no good guys and bad guys I emphasized recently in an article. There are only villains and their victims, population belonging to all the nations of former Yugoslavia. I believe that the international community and, above all the strongest power, the United States, should put in focus the sufferings of the population on all sides of this war and conduct their policies in the way to spare them further sufferings to the extent possible. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Rohrabacher.

CONDEMNING SERBIAN AGGRESSION

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think it might have been well-advised had we had someone from Bosnia on this panel today and people who are being victimized, yet their voice is not being heard.

When we are taking a look at this issue of the embargo, let us just put it flat out. Genocidal war is being waged at this moment against Bosnians, Croatians and anybody else who gets in the way of Serbian goals for a greater Serbia. That is the bottom line.

Yes, there are good guys and bad guys. The good guys are the victims. And an embargo that we have today is an embargo against the victims, recognizing that the Serbians are armed to the teeth and are using their heavy weapons against unarmed civilians. I don't understand how any moral person can watch television and can watch heavy Serbian artillery pumping round after round into a city that is being occupied by unarmed civilians, as well as their defenders, but the shells are going into the civilian areas of the city, and then to suggest that we have to stand back and honor an arms embargo that prevents the victims from defending themselves.

This is one of the most immoral and tragic things that I have ever witnessed. And I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I have to contain myself from losing my temper at this point. The arms embargo was never well-intentioned, with all due respect to my colleagues. The arms embargo was proposed by the Yugoslav Government when it was dominated by the Serbs. It is a Serb ploy from day one and they have succeeded.

Mr. Djordjevich, you mentioned that the Bosnians may have tanks now. Could you tell me how many Bosnian tanks are in Serbia killing Serbians?

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. I will be glad to tell you, Congressman. None.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is the answer. That is all right.

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. May I ask how many Serbian tanks are in Bosnia?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Give me a chance now, sir. You answered my question and that is the essential thing that people have to understand when analyzing what is going on in the Balkans today.

You have a well-armed Serbian Army with tanks, artillery, with airplanes, or we would not have shot them down and shut down that operation early on. And those tanks and artillery, manned by people who are allied with the Serbians, if not under their control, are going throughout that area murdering innocent people who do not have the weapons to defeat them.

Yes, perhaps if the Bosnians had antitank weapons in the beginning, the Serbian element there that controlled those tanks would not have felt so confident to go into Serbian villages, or into Muslim villages and conduct ethnic cleansing like a bunch of Nazis. The Serbians are acting like a bunch of Nazis.

You talked about them being vilified. It is not hard to vilify people who are committing genocide and acting like Nazis. Pardon me for losing my temper.

CONFLICT CHARACTERIZED AS CIVIL WAR

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. That is fine, Congressman, but let us put something straight, right in the beginning: we have a Civil War here. We do not have aggression. What I am saying, there are no Bosnian tanks in Serbia; there are no Serbian tanks in Bosnia. The tanks in Bosnia belong to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs have lived in Bosnia for 400, 700 years. That is a civil war.

Are you going to tell me that Sherman's march to and burning of Atlanta was a genocide and that it was a "foreign intervention" in Southern States? That is what you are saying, sir. That is precisely what you are saying.

SERBIAN OBJECTIVES

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have read what Serbian friends of mine have given me, and I will recognize—I have Serbian friends, and I recognize that Serbian people have done many wonderful things over the centuries. And my friends come to me and they say, look, you just do not understand. Read this book. This will tell you about what is going on in the Balkans. And every time they give me a book to understand why Serbia is doing the things it is doing, every time it reconfirms to me that the root cause of the butchering and the bloodshed and the loss of life of innocent civilians is a paranoia on the part of the Serbian population that has agreed with former Communist rulers to permit their people to commit brutal acts that a civilized society would not put up with.

You yourself, sir, if I can quote—and this is before the hostilities began—quoted the goals of Serbia saying, if I might quote from an article, you say one of the goals—the goals of the Serbians is ethnic and territorial unification of all Serbs residing in the present Yugoslavia, as the goals of Serbia.

Well, if you have those goals and you have people, Serbians, that are spread out in other countries, well, then, the goal of Serbia, if it is to unite them, to accomplish that goal you are going to be killing a lot of innocent people and being involved in aggression.

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. That is your conclusion. Serbs lived in one country which was Yugoslavia, and we destroyed that country together with all the people of Yugoslavia. So what they want to do now, just like Croats want to live with the Croats and the Albanians wants to live with Albanians, they want to live together. So what is wrong?

The Germans can get unified and the Serbs cannot get unified? What kind of a logic is there that we permit one people to unite, but not the same thing to another people. And that is the problem. We have double standards, Congressman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You had the last word.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Fingerhut.

FEARS OF WIDENING THE WAR IF EMBARGO LIFTED

Mr. FINGERHUT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could stay on the question of the embargo for a moment, because it troubles me on the same grounds that Mr. Rohrabacher and others have mentioned, though perhaps I will not speak with quite the same passion as he has. You do hear as a response in virtually every discussion of this issue, the fear of the widening of the war, of adding weapons into essentially a tinderbox, which has been the historic source of European and world war for certainly this century and probably for many centuries.

And I wonder, even for those of us who see the moral side of the argument as you have laid it out, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others, do we concern ourselves with the lighting of a tinderbox? How

do you respond, you or others on the panel, to that concern, if we were, in fact, to inject increased arms into this situation.

THE CASE FOR SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE IN BOSNIA

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. May I, Congressman? I believe that violence of the sort that one finds today in Bosnia is contagious in two ways: It is contagious, first, because the reality of successful conquest and genocide tempts the savage instincts of other would-be conquerors and marauders in surrounding countries where there is also a good deal of instability already, and encourages the likes of Zhirinovsky in Russia. It is contagious in that way.

And, second, it is contagious in another way. If Bosnia-Herzegovina is permitted to be totally overrun and conquered, and the remaining non-Serb population driven out, that the Serbian Government will turn its attention to Macedonia and Kosovo and elsewhere in the region, perhaps Albania itself ultimately, where there is already a great deal of instability. War has already spread.

Already there is subversion and aggression against Macedonia and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. So I think that that will happen if there is no resistance.

A successful resistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina would require both lifting the arms embargo and some immediate air strikes, and would probably lead to a change in the Government in Serbia, which is what the Serbian people and the people in the region need most of all.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LIFTING EMBARGO

Mr. FINGERHUT. I thank you for that answer, Ambassador, and I think that is the correct answer. I would add to it that in watching the negotiations, it just seems apparent to me that it is simply impossible and, therefore, irrelevant to rely on the word of this Serbian Government in this regard. And every time I see an official either of this government or of the United Nations saying, well, they have promised X, Y and Z, in light of the recent history of those promises, it is almost embarrassing.

Could I ask you Ambassador Zimmermann—perhaps you could work it into your response—you spoke strongly in favor of air strikes. Ambassador Kirkpatrick has stated what I think many of us believe, that maybe both are necessary. In order to be effective, as you have argued, what is, in your view, the extent of the military commitment that you would prescribe? How much would it take to do what you think needs to be done?

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. Congressman, on the embargo, it is a very difficult, troubling question. It is obviously unfair. The playing field is not level. But I think it is also necessary to look at what would be implied for the United States if we decided unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. We would have to answer a number of questions:

Would we be prepared to fly air sorties with transport planes to bring the tanks and heavy artillery into the Bosnians, with the risk the Serbs would have every incentive, and we know they have the means, to shoot them down? Would we be prepared to launch perhaps an even larger campaign of air strikes to allow the Bosnians

to be trained on the weapons in the face of a probable major Serbian offensive?

And, finally, if the purpose is to create a situation in which the Bosnians actually are able to get back all or most of the land that was taken by the Serbian aggression, and if the fact that the Bosnians have additional weapons does not do that for them, since of course they can never compete with Serbian equipment, which comes from one of the largest armies in Europe, are we then prepared to bring in ground troops to help them recapture that territory?

I think these are all questions that need to be looked at up front as the whole issue of the arms embargo is addressed.

I share the moral feeling that Ambassador Kirkpatrick has expressed and that you have expressed, but I am also concerned that we may not be prepared to take these additional steps. And if we do not take them, then lifting the arms embargo becomes kind of a hollow act which could indeed be counterproductive.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL AIR CAMPAIGN

On the question of the extent of air strikes, I think the Clinton administration would need to make it clear and we would need to get, I am afraid, international support for this, if we could—that may be difficult—to make it clear that we would be prepared as long as Serbian aggression continues in Bosnia to attack any Serbian military target in Bosnia. In other words, we would not restrict ourselves just to the safe areas, but we could hit lines of communication, we could hit fuel dumps, bridges, anything that is a military target in Bosnia.

And if we made that clear and it was credible that we were ready to do it and Milosevic and Karadzic got that message that we are going to be consistent in this, we were not going to stop, it would not be just one episode and then we would talk about it for a while, we were ready to go after these targets one by one until the aggression stopped, then I think we would get the Serbs to the table and we would get a settlement.

THE CASE FOR A PARTIAL SOLUTION

Now, the settlement, I think, would be at best about 50 percent of the territory for the Serbs and 50 percent for the Croats and Muslims. That is not ideal, obviously. It allows the Serbs to retain a large amount of territory which they have taken. But it is so late in the game now, so much has been lost by the Muslims for a variety of reasons, including U.S. and Western inaction, that to rectify that now, I think, would not be possible simply by lifting the arms embargo. It would take a much more massive use of American force and probably ground force.

So the question is are we prepared to take this partial solution, which is not totally moral? To agree with that, or hold out for something which, in my view, is at this late stage unattainable.

PROSPECTS FOR BROAD-BASED SUPPORT FOR AIR CAMPAIGN

Chairman HAMILTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINGERHUT. Yield to the distinguished chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, I was interested in your comment about widening the bombing. You said, I think, we would like to get international support if we could. You also said it would be difficult to do. And that is what triggers my question.

If you look at the disputes that have gone on in NATO and in the United Nations on the very narrow question of bombing in Gorazde, where objections were made to bombing very narrow military targets such as supply lines or command posts, what makes you think that NATO or the United Nations would support wider bombing in Bosnia?

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. Well, it is a question of leadership. There has to be strong American leadership on this. When there was American leadership on the issue of threatening Sarajevo, which was, of course, a very precedent-setting action, we got NATO's support and we got U.N. support. My guess is NATO would not be a problem on this. I think NATO has acquitted itself extremely well so far in the Bosnian situation.

I think the problem will be the U.N. If President Clinton decides he is going to go for this wider bombing, I think he would have to make a major effort to get the U.N. to agree.

THE RISK OF MILITARY ACTION TO TROOPS ON THE GROUND

Chairman HAMILTON. It has always impressed me that whenever we take the position of broadening the military action, that our European allies, to say nothing of Russia, object very strongly because they have troops on the ground and we do not and, therefore, their people are at risk and we are not. Or, to put it in the graphic language of the Prime Minister of England, the body bags will come back to London and not to Washington.

Now, that seems to me to be the obstacle for us; that we cannot get over the hurdle. Most of us, I think, might agree that wider bombing would be appropriate and helpful, but we cannot get over that hurdle. And you say, well, it is a question of leadership. Maybe it is, but I am not sure you can get over that hurdle no matter what kind of leadership you have unless you deal with this question of troops on the ground. They are at risk if we bomb; we are not.

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. It is true, and in the interest of shortening the war and reaching a decent agreement through a bombing campaign, I would not exclude withdrawing the entire UNPROFOR forces and all the relief organizations from Bosnia. I think that would give a very powerful signal to Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic that we were serious about the bombing.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you. Mr. Fingerhut, go right ahead.

Mr. FINGERHUT. I have no time to reclaim, but if you would allow me to ask one follow-up question to Ambassador Zimmermann's previous answer, which prompted your question.

Chairman HAMILTON. Sure.

WHAT AIR STRIKES COULD ACCOMPLISH

Mr. FINGERHUT. I was provoked by your insistence that the question of American ground troops would be a question we would have to confront up front. I think everyone would agree with that. But then you seem to come back to the issue at the end of your answer

and almost argue it would be a necessary support if we were going to accomplish our military aims in the air or the aim of supplying the Muslims for lifting the arms embargo.

Let me ask you as directly as I can. Let us confront up front the question of willingness to send ground troops. If the answer is no—and I think the answer clearly is no certainly today from the American people—would you still believe that air strikes and lifting the arms embargo can have the desired effect?

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. I would like to separate the two issues. I think we can get what I would call a decent agreement, but not an ideal one, with air strikes alone, if they are consistent—without the use of ground forces. I think we can do that, and without raising the arms embargo. If we cannot do that, then I think we have to look at the issue of raising the arms embargo with all of what that implies: U.S. transports, air strikes to protect the Bosnians so they can train on the arms, and, at the end of the day, possibly having to send in ground troops if they start to lose, and they end up losing more than they have lost already.

QUESTIONING UTILITY OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO

Mr. FINGERHUT. This was the comment that provoked me, not angrily, but provoked my wanting to get a clear answer. You believe lifting the arms embargo necessarily is a slippery slope to ground troops. That seems to be the essence of your statement.

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. No, I do not think necessarily it is, but I do not think we can necessarily assume that lifting the arms embargo is going to put the Bosnians in a better military position vis-a-vis the Serbs. Because the Serbs have an enormous amount of unused military capacity in Serbia that they could deploy in this war.

Mr. FINGERHUT. We could do it. No guarantee of success. We could do it and say understand up front no ground troops are coming.

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. You could do that.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Baker, I will get to you next. I apologize keeping you waiting. We are glad to have you at the hearing.

Mr. BAKER. Thank you.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey.

COMMENDING WITNESSES FOR LEADERSHIP ON BOSNIA

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize to our distinguished panel for the fact I was late coming in from two other hearings and markups. I particularly want to thank Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Ambassador Zimmermann for their leadership on efforts which are a major part of our national and international dialogue on this, and also note that having first got interested in this when Ambassador Zimmermann was stationed in Belgrade in 1991.

I recall your political officer Jim Swihart telling me at that time, when the Serbian-Croatian war was raging, that indeed there would be trouble down the road in Bosnia, and those predictions have unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, come true.

BOSNIA-KOSOVO ANALOGY

I would like to ask the Ambassadors a question in a moment, but in the interest of honest dialogue and mutual respect, I would like to point out to Mr. Djordjevich that there are a lot of Serbs, particularly in Bosnia, and I am sure to a lesser degree in Serbia, who do not agree with the overall thrust of your statement, particularly the 40,000 Serbs loyal to the Bosnian leadership and society. For example, many of them I have met live in Sarajevo.

You justify the horrible state of affairs perpetrated by Serbs and some Bosnian Serbs, afraid to live in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where you say they are denied full equal religious, civil and cultural rights as well as legal protection, by saying these Serbs felt they had no other choice, but to defend their basic human and civil rights with force of arms.

Now, I guess in your mind you are sincere in saying this. What do you say as far as that analogy being applied to Kosovo, where things are happening to Albanians, if you will, or Muslims, if you will, at the hands of the Serbian leadership and forces and which dwarf any problems Serbs had in Bosnia and Croatia?

Does Kosovo have a right to secede? What about all the people thrown out of their jobs, imprisoned, beaten, shot, as a matter of course, which we frankly hear so little about?

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. Well, you ask too many questions. So let me say something, if I can.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I just asked one question, Mr. Djordjevich. How about justice for Kosovoans, who are being brutalized, much worse than any Serb minority, in Bosnia and Croatia?

It is one question. What is good for the goose is good for the gander, why cannot Kosovo secede?

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. That is a fair question, Congressman, and I have pondered on that myself many times. Let me just say at the beginning that as far as I am concerned, I did meet with Kosovoan Albanians. I understand their grievances.

Ambassador Zimmermann was kind enough to arrange a meeting 3 years ago, so I am quite aware of the things you are saying.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You do not deny, then, for the record that that is happening?

THE SERBIAN PERSPECTIVE ON KOSOVO

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. Not what you are describing, sir. But I do say that there are grievances in Kosovo just like there are in Krajina or Bosnia. The war-torn country has a lot of grievances, and we are pouring oil into the fire in some way with things we are talking about here, with lifting the arms embargo and other things. But the fears and mindset of the Serbian people you have to keep in mind.

And in the quote you gave, I emphasized one word, the Serbs "felt" they had to defend themselves. Because 1941 to 1944 was the first phase of the Civil War in Yugoslavia—what is continuing now is the second phase, and this is not recognized quite well, that there is a continuation between the situation in 1941–44 and today. These people are descendants of the Serbian people who were then slaughtered by thousands and hundreds of thousands.

And when they found themselves now going to live in states which had the same insignias and practically carried out the same slaughters, these people felt they had to protect themselves.

They just felt so, whether right or wrong; I am just saying this is their mindset, and this was not presented to us here.

Now, as far as Kosovo and Krajina are concerned, those are two very difficult and different problems. I believe they have to be resolved between Croatia and Serbia and the people involved, and it will not be resolved unless we resolve the Bosnian crisis, and that is the precedent we have to go for.

THE NEXT STEP IN BOSNIA

Mr. McCloskey. I thank you for your efforts at a reply. Obviously, there are so many implications I guess I would have some disagreement, but we do not have the time for that.

Just one last question, then, to Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Kirkpatrick. We all know where we are now. Given the present lack of resolve in U.S. and Western policy, and I think I am being charitable there. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, what is the portend for the immediate future as to Bosnia and the region?

I would hook onto that question the fact that there is a French proposal today which says solve it now or get out. I did not read all the details, but as I recall from the early morning it did technically come out for a unitary sovereign Bosnia.

With that, I thank both of you for your efforts in this.

U.S. LEADERSHIP CAN BRING LIMITED PROGRESS

Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Congressman. I don't feel adequately informed about the French proposal to comment on it, except to say what I said before, that I think any solution that would be imposed by force and then enforced by the super powers, which is what the headlines said, is the worst possible solution.

I do not believe we should commit American forces to the ground in former Yugoslavia, period. And I certainly do not believe we should commit them to enforcing an agreement which was imposed by force.

For the immediate future we might focus on noting that there is no valid arms embargo—I don't speak about lifting an arms embargo. Since there is no relevant arms embargo, it is time that we cease enforcing it; that American military forces cease enforcing an arms embargo which has no legal grounding.

Two, it is time that we begin finally to genuinely enforce the U.N. resolutions which are on the books which provide for the use of necessary force for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; for the provision of safe zones; for the projection of civilians within those safe zones; and for no-fly zones. If we did those things, if we noted the arms embargo does not exist and enforced the existing resolutions, that would help.

In addition, I noticed that Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, said in a press conference a week ago in response to a question, that things are getting better. The President said the other day that people are alive in Sarajevo, in Mostar, and Maglaj and elsewhere, who would not be alive today if the situation had not improved. It has improved because the President and the Unit-

ed States pushed and led NATO into taking action it had not previously taken.

Is it all we would like? No, but it is progress. He says if we continue to offer leadership, there will be more progress.

I believe here he is right.

NEED FOR CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE

Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Ambassador, could you comment as to where it goes from here without some more significant resolve?

Mr. Zimmermann. Well, if the foreign ministers who are meeting in Geneva on Friday can find a formula that they can sell to all three sides, that would be fine. I very strongly doubt they will be able to do that because I do not think the Serbs are yet convinced that they cannot take more territory, and particularly that they cannot take Sarajevo, which is still a major objective untaken by them.

Mr. McCloskey. I said last night they will go back to Sarajevo.

Mr. Zimmermann. Yes, and I think it is going to take more serious force and threat of force, at least a credible threat of force, to convince the Serbs that they are not going to be able to get any more and that they will have to come to the table and give the Bosnians a decent viable living space that the Bosnians can accept.

And I absolutely agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we should not impose a peace on the parties. All three sides have to agree, I think, for it to have any chance of stability.

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Baker.[1]

DIFFICULTIES OF DRAWING BOUNDARIES IN BOSNIA

Mr. Baker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for presenting this issue and for allowing us to hear from three of the four sides, at least.

There are about 47, the last time I looked, wars going on in the world today, and the United States constantly tries to find the good guys and we are always painting good guys as bad guys. In the war between the Croatians and the Muslims, for Mr. Rohrabacher's benefit, who were the good guys? This war has been going on for 500 years. It was escalated during World War II. And we are constantly now trying to find the good guys. If only we had armed the good guys, we would be out of it.

There was a peace pact about 6 months ago that was imminent and all the parties were meeting. They were trying the difficult job of dividing up the boundaries. This is a mountainous area. It is not a flat piece of land where you can say Serbs over here, Croatians over here, Muslims over here: Done.

Sarajevo is important because it is a crossroads; is that correct? It is not important because everyone wants to live there. There is a whole bunch of people living there under various ethnic and religious backgrounds. So we have to look at this technically as a very difficult situation from how do people get from one village to another; how do they move goods and materials in future years.

---

[1] Bill Baker is a Representative in Congress from the State of California.

So the peace pact was imminent until the United States blundered in and said we think we can get a better deal for one of the parties, at which time one of the parties pulled out and what do we have? More bloodshed; more war. Now we are talking about, well, let us arm one of the sides. There are two sides left, one has been defeated. So we arm one of the sides and we have more bloodshed and more war, and where are we?

We are back to the original truism stated today by Mr. Djordjevich that the parties do not want to live under each other. So we have to go back to the peace table and we have to say, where do the Serb villages—where do they want to connect? How do the Bosnians have land connecting?

Mr. Zimmermann said this would not be such a great deal because they are down to 50 percent of what they thought they wanted. What they thought they wanted was not acceptable at the time to the Croatians or the Serbs. So now we have to become realistic. How do we divide this land state so that all of the parties will be happy for longer than 10 minutes; longer than the next election? And that is the difficult part we are in.

I think if we import more arms, we are just postponing that day that we drive the parties to the peace table to begin drawing those difficult lines. So if we want to do it, fine. I do not think the American people want us involved.

We are trying to find the good guys in Haiti. We will get in there and lift the great nation of Haiti up and hand it over to someone who is mentally unstable, even though he was elected by a minority of these people? Is that what we want to do? And the American people say, no. So the answer is to import more Haitians to California or to Florida. That is not acceptable either.

So in all of these difficult situations, anything that drives the parties to the peace table to begin drawing those difficult lines is good. Anything that prolongs the war and allows it to go on is just going to hasten the day when the parties are forced to sit down and give up something. All parties are going to have to give up something because the country is not well-designed for the three parties that have to be dividing it. And so you have to consider trade routes, you have to consider transportation, you have to consider economics and geography, and it is very difficult.

And if we think we can get in and just defeat the bad guys today, the other two bad guys will begin bickering and fighting sure as heck because they have been doing it for 500 years.

I don't have any questions. I just do not think that we should jump in there thinking that we can find and identify a good guy, and that if we just give more arms to one side or the other that this will be over. What is going to occur is forcing to the peace table where we were 6 months ago before we put our thumb on the scale and tried to right the wrong. And I think you are going to find a Bosnia that will be integrated, but it will be smaller than the original lines. That may not be unrealistic considering what Croatia wants, considering what the other countries in the area want.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. It is extremely important that we hear from all sides.

CAN BOSNIANS LIVE IN PEACE

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Baker.

Let me ask the witnesses who have a personal identification with the former Yugoslavia a simple question, can these people ever live together in peace?

Mr. DAMICH. Shall I begin?

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. DAMICH. I think that certainly is true. They can live together in peace. I might add that England, France and Germany have been warring for 500 years, if not more, and it was not difficult for us in World War II and World War I to decide who were the good guys and who were the bad guys. I think that the Croatian and the Serbian and the Muslim people can indeed live together.

I might point out that Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been devoted to a multiethnic solution since the very foundation of the very declaration of independence of that state. It is the Serbia and the Bosnia Serb surrogates in that country that have destroyed that multiethnic society.

I might also point out that one of the problems is not simply a matter of land grabbing, which of course is central to the Serbian thrust, but it is also a matter of ethnic cleansing. We are not saying, oh, let them have their real estate. We are saying let them have their real estate and let them kill and drive the people out of that real estate as well.

I really think that the result of what Mr. Baker is asking for will be the ratification of ethnic cleansing and of aggression, and it will encourage the Serbs to do the same thing in Kosovo and Macedonia, and it will encourage Zhirinovsky **and Kim Il-Sung and you will have far more a problem than you have now.**

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. If we had tried to force France, Britain and Germany to live in one country under the French, you would, indeed, have the same situation that you have today.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Djordjevich and then Ambassador Matic.

THE CASE FOR PARTITION OF BOSNIA

Mr. DJORDJEVICH. Well, it is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. For my part, I would say at this moment and for the foreseeable future, we have to go back to a good saying we have in this country: "tall fences make good neighbors." I believe and I can argue intellectually, if necessary, that at this point, at a point where you have these emotions and all of this that has happened, the best thing is just like two people who were in a heat of a fight, to separate them.

Those are irreconcilable differences now the way these people look on the problem. And like in any divorce, let us divorce them. Let them go separate ways and very soon they will discover that they need each other. Like good neighbors with tall fences, they will start opening the doors and getting together. But to force, now, this union on them is a prescription for disaster. More bombing

means more deaths, more killings and no results. Lifting embargo is the same thing. It is escalation of the war.

We have to stop the war. Europeans want to stop the war. The Russians do not want war. We are driving a wedge between the Yeltsin government and Russian people who are supportive of the Serbs. We have to stop the war. We have to stop killing.

We made a lot of mistakes. Let us not compound them with more bombings and more embargoes and more diplomatic minuets and other things going on. Let these people live the way they want to live. Give them ability to separate; and they are going to find a way very soon, I think, much sooner than anybody thinks, to cooperate; that is, once they are separate and feel secure in their own lands.

As Mr. Baker correctly pointed out, France and Germany and England are able to get together now because they have their territories. They fought for them. They have their national identities. They are able now in the stage of their development to overcome their differences and be together. And this is what is needed in Yugoslavia.

We need a period of moratorium, if you wish, in politics. We need a period of the great powers getting out of the Balkans. That includes Germany, in particular, and Turkey and other Islamic countries, and let these people alone to rebuild their lives, and then they will get together. That is my opinion.

CONTAINING NATIONALISM IN U.S. INTEREST

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. MATIC. My answer would be simply, yes. We have been listening to a lot of arguments during the past several years about traditional hostility and animosity among these peoples. At various panels and lectures I challenged anyone to give me historic facts to support that, except for the period of the Second World War. I rarely get any answers. And we must not forget that France and Germany and Italy were also born in blood as nation states, and so were the Balkan states, all of them, but at the end of the 19th century and beginning of 20th century. What is happening now is in a different time and is a retrograde process, which has to be stopped.

Yugoslavia, certainly, at least I do not believe, can be reconstructed as it was. It certainly would not be acceptable to any of the former Yugoslav nations at this point in time. But the fact is that no nation, no state, newly born state in that region, has a chance unless they establish mutual cooperation and they reestablish the broken links between their economies and in other fields. And the same goes with their relations with the neighboring countries. And for that, of course, we need peace. And in prosperity everything will look differently.

At the moment, we must not forget that all these states are being created or have been created based on national intolerance and it will take time for that poison to go away. Unlike communism, nationalism is very infectious and spreads unbelievably fast into other regions, and this is the danger of the crisis in Yugoslavia, and I believe that can make a small Bosnia far away from the United States a national interest of this country and acquire

the attention needed for a policy which would contribute to the solution of the crisis.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey.

WITNESS RESIGNATION FROM DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much for your generosity, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Damich, I have not been here for the whole hearing, as I said, but I have been told that you resigned in disgust from the diplomatic service because of the Milosevic regime. Is that true, and could you elaborate on that and tell us what went on with that?

Mr. ZIMMERMANN. Is that a question for me?

Mr. DAMICH. I am Mr. Damich. Mr. Matic is the person you want to address.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I am sorry, I meant Mr. Matic.

Mr. MATIC. Well, I could, I would certainly need a lot of time to talk about my experience and everything that led me to resign about a year ago. In response, since we have not that time at our disposal here, I would just shortly outline that I could not accept not representing a country, but an autocratic regime.

I was career diplomat for 28 years. I joined the service as an intern and made my way up to Assistant Federal Minister, never belonging to a political or other power group. This was not possible anymore at the time I resigned.

I also represented for decades a country advocating peace and cooperation, believing in friendship with all other nations, and this was no more the case and I could not accept a different policy.

I worked with foreign diplomats, and in the service I worked with people from other republics, belonging to other nations of Yugoslavia, and it never bothered me. I did not care. I took the people for what they were; what they represented, and this was simply not possible anymore and, therefore, I resigned.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. With respect, I thank you, sir.

Mr. MATIC. This is in a nutshell.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you so much.

Chairman HAMILTON. I think we understand that Ambassadors are often put in very difficult positions in their representation, and you and Ambassador Zimmermann have expressed that very eloquently.

This is an extremely difficult problem. Our witnesses have addressed it with real insight. We are grateful to each of you and we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS

Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives
May 11, 1994

Opening remarks by Michael Djordjevich

Mr. Chairman.
Honorable members of the Committee.

If the Bosnian problem is "a problem from hell," as Secretary of State Christopher has aptly described it, then the Balkan problem is indeed a catastrophe in the making. We still have a chance to prevent this catastrophe from happening, although time is running very short.

Our Central Intelligence Agency made the prediction of the Yugoslav crisis about 18 months before it broke forth. Yet we did little to prevent it from happening.

The principal blame for the Yugoslav tragedy must go to the Yugoslavs in general and to their political leaders in particular. It was these leaders who abused the latent nationalist forces in their respective republics in order to legitimize their monopoly of power. The leaders in the secessionist republics also succumbed to influences coming from the newly unified and resurgent Germany and certain Islamic states.

We, that is, our goverment, have also contributed substanially to the creation of the "problem from hell." From the beginning of the Yugoslav tragedy, our actions have been contradictory.

For a while, we ardently supported the Helsinki Accords, especially the provisions of Article III, Clause IV which guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of the participating states. Yet in the summer of 1991, although we publicly tried to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia, we allowed

German Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher to encourage Croatia and Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia -- a state which was a signatory to the Helsinki Accords of 1975.

Soon thereafter, we accepted the position of Germany and Austria that the multiethnic and multireligious Yugoslavia was an artificial entity which had to be dissolved, the Helsinki Accords notwithstanding.

Reversing our policy again, we began to insist that the small part of Yugoslavia called Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a multiethnic, multireligious population and a minority Muslim-led government, was a viable entity. We also recognized the right of the Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims to secede from Yugoslavia. But we denied the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the right to remain in Yugoslavia.

With our hasty recognition of the breakaway republics of former Yugoslavia, we forced one third of the entire Serbian population in Yugoslavia to live in hostile states. Afraid to live in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are denied fully equal religious, civil, and cultural rights as well as legal protection, these Serbs felt that they had no other choice but to defend their basic human and civil rights with arms. To this the international community promptly reacted by declaring them the "aggressors" and even "invaders," who together with the Serbs in Yugoslavia had to be severely punished.

And punish the Serbs we did. But it was their children, their sick and poor as well as their old people who came to feel the punishment of our sanctions most. Furthermore, we expelled the so-called "aggressive" Yugoslavia from the United Nations, while condoning the invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the regular army of Croatia. Finally, we participated in a campaign to demonize Serbia and the Serbs, a campaign that is evidently thoroughly planned and very well financed and is being conducted on a world-wide scale.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that these policies are not only self-contradictory but also highly unprincipled. By all accounts, they are unbecoming of our great nation and our longstanding democratic traditions.

By destabilizing Yugoslavia, we are destabilizing the Balkans, and if this process were to continue, the whole of Europe would also become destabilized. Thus far, the evidence suggests that we have been collaborating with Germany in forging a Croat-Muslim alliance. If successful, this alliance would ultimately lead to a weakened Serbia and Greece and, thus, open the way for Germany to realize her long-coveted goals: (1) a free access -- by way of the Adriatic -- to the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East and (2) virtual control over one of the most important international waterways, the Danube River. The fuse, however, that would light the Balkan powder keg is a "greater Albania." We seem determined to create such a state by expanding Albania's current boundaries to include portions of the territories and peoples of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and northern Greece.

If our policymakers do indeed persist with this policy, then they will condemn this region of Europe, a region of immense geopolitical importance, to war and turmoil for a long time to come. Such a situation would lend itself eventually to military intervention by the Russians who are pro-Serbian.

The European Community would very likely split up over this issue and form itself into two blocks, one led by England and France and the other by Germany, a formation that has occured twice before in this century.

If it is our goal, then, to: (1) keep the Balkans in turmoil, (2) destabilize Europe, (3) hasten the advent of a defiant and strong nationalist Russian state, (4) support the establishment of a "Germanic Belt" from the Baltics to the Adriatic, (5) create out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Greater Albania a bridgehead for expansion of Islam into Europe, then the policies we are pursuing are indeed on the right track.

If that is not our goal, however, what steps can we take to prevent the war in former Yugoslavia from widening into a Balkan war that would be a major catstrophe by all counts?

Above all else, we must stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This can be done in the following way:

1. Enforce a total ceasefire;

2. Impose on all belligerents the condition that they settle all territorial claims and other unresolved issues by binding arbitration. Allow them 30 days to reduce the number of issues that require arbitration and work out ways in which the differences between them are narrowed down.

3. Establish an arbitration panel consisting of two experts appointed by the Croats and Muslims, and two experts appointed by the Serbs. Allow the panel 90 days to come up with viable solutions.

In addition to these three steps, there is the fourth of very great importance: we must immediately suspend the sanctions that we have imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. As a political and diplomatic weapon, these sanctions have utterly failed.

In closing, Mr. Chariman, I wish respectfully to submit two proposals:

First, I urge this Committee to advise the House of Representatives to pass a binding resolution that is based on the four steps outlined above.

Second, I urge this Committee that it does <u>not</u> support the lifting of the arms embargo in former Yugoslavia.

The first proposal calls for peace and provides ways to ensure that peace. The second proposal aims at preventing the renewal of a devastating cycle of war with all the human suffering incumbent upon it.

Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the Committee, I thank you for your attention.

Michael Djordjevich

Michael Djordjevich

U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

by Edward J. Damich
President, National Federation of Croatian Americans
Professor of Law, George Mason University
May 11, 1994

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

United States policy regarding the former Yugoslavia--as that of the international community--has been ineffectual at best. It has bounced between pusillanimous internationalism and narrow isolationism.

The keys to an effective U.S. policy regarding the former Yugoslavia are clarity and resolve.

Clarity requires jettisoning the many myths that have created a fog around this problem. Instead, the following truths should be kept in mind:

1. The former Yugoslavia was characterized by Serbian hegemony. It was no Balkan Switzerland; we should not regret its passing.

2. Serbia--not Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Germany--was responsible for the break up of Yugoslavia.

3. Alleged mistreatment of the Serbian minority in other republics was only a pretext to create a Great Serbia by force. Serbia has compelling economic reasons to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and to seize Dalmatia and Slavonia.

4. Painting the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs as constantly warring primitives is inaccurate and racist.

5. The areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied by the Serbs are not ethnically homogeneous.

6. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is more precisely understood as the defense of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina by its legitimate, multiethnic government against an attempt by Serbia through its Bosnian Serb surrogates to annex all or part of it.

7. Serbia's systematic policy of conquest and ethnic-cleansing has no equal on the Croatian and Bosnian side.

8. Neither the Croatian government nor the Croatian people is fascist.

9. The borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are based on historical and ethnic realties.

10. Neither Croatia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina has asked for massive foreign ground troops.

11. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is distinguishable from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. It is similar to Kuwait.

Current U.S. policy seeks to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table by discouraging further conquests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia through military force and by offering the lifting of economic sanctions on Serbia. In the best case, Croatia will get back its occupied territories, and 50% of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be annexed to Serbia. Even the best case scenario is morally bankrupt because to ratifies aggression and ethnic cleansing.

To achieve a just solution and therefore a lasting peace, the international community must provide Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the means to vindicate their international borders. The international community must lift the arms embargo against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and provide the necessary air support to level the playing field.

U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

by Edward J. Damich
President, National Federation of Croatian Americans
Professor of Law, George Mason University
May 11, 1994

United States policy regarding the former Yugoslavia--as that of the international community--has been ineffectual at best. It has bounced between pusillanimous internationalism and narrow isolationism.

At first, when decisive action was relatively painless, many internationalists avoided decisive action by refusing to identify the culprits--Slobodan Milosevic and his Great Serbian henchmen.[1] Lately only the thoroughly self-deluded do not see the Serbs as the guilty party. But now that the Serbs have conquered 30% of Croatia and 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have consolidated their gains by slaughtering and driving out the non-Serb inhabitants, these same internationalists find a ready, albeit perverse, rationale for continued indecision by shrinking from the greater sacrifices that would now be required to deprive the Serbs of the fruits of imperialism and ethnic cleansing. This kind enjoys a good cry in the Holocaust Museum and then ignores its message of "Never Again!"

While the internationalists engaged in denial and dithering, the isolationists, not much concerned with international justice, recognized from the very beginning that the Serbs were the aggressors. Such truth was risk-free, since they could quickly hide behind a cramped view of "national interest" that pretends that Zhirinovsky and Kim Il Sung are not reading the dispatches from the Balkans. In a world of NAFTA and GATT, international terrorism and portable atomic weapons, "Fortress America" will prove to be as impregnable as the Maginot Line.

The keys to an effective U.S. policy regarding the former Yugoslavia are clarity and resolve.

I. Clarity

Clarity requires jettisoning the many myths that have created a fog around this problem. Instead, the following truths should be kept in mind:

1. The former Yugoslavia was characterized by Serbian

---

[1] For the sake of brevity, I will refer to them as "Serbs," as journalists refer to "Bosnian Serbs" as a group although some Bosnian Serbs reject Great Serbia.

hegemony.

As the former Soviet Union was a multinational pretense for Russian domination, so the former Yugoslavia was a multinational pretense for Serbian domination. Although a great show of multinational distribution of offices was made at the highest levels, the government bureaucracy and the armed forces were dominated by Serbs. The most developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia, were required to subsidize Serbia[2] economically. Although there is much Serbian obfuscation of these points, one truth is undeniable: when given the opportunity, every single republic of the former Yugoslavia except Serbia and Montenegro voted overwhelmingly to secede from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was no Balkan Switzerland; we should not regret its passing.

2. Serbia was responsible for the break up of Yugoslavia.

In the Constitution of 1974, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had begun to evolve from a centralist state to a confederal one. The 1974 Constitution, for example, provided for secession of republics and it provided for virtual republican status for the autonomous provinces. This development was arrested by Slobodan Milosevic who forcibly and unconstitutionally abolished the autonomy of Kossovo and Vojvodina. Before declaring independence, Slovenia and Croatia proposed a confederation plan to keep Yugoslavia together. When Milosevic refused even to discuss it seriously, their alternatives were either to be subsumed into a centralist, Serb state or to declare independence.

3. Germany is not responsible for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The Serbian army attacked Slovenia and Croatia before either country was recognized by Germany or the European Community. Germany was *one* of the countries that favored EC recognition. Germany did not recognize Slovenia and Croatia until the EC had decided to so. The EC also quickly recognized all of the former republics of the Soviet Union. Not recognizing Slovenia and Croatia would have encouraged Serbia in its efforts to subjugate them.

---

[2] I will use "Serbia" instead of "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Using "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" promotes two myths: (1) that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is genuinely multinational when practical political power is exclusively Serbian and (2) that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is actually a state when it has not been recognized by the international community. No one would doubt that Slobodan Milosevic holds the reins of power in "Yugoslavia," but he is only the President of Serbia. The use of "Serbia" to refer solely to the Republic of Serbia will be clear from the context.

4. Alleged mistreatment of the Serbian minority in other republics was only a pretext to create a Great Serbia by force.

The Serbian army first attacked Slovenia which has no Serbian minority. The Serbian minority in Croatia was not in mortal danger, and given Croatia's burning desire to become part of the West, there were ample means available to the international community to ensure equal treatment of the Serbs should it have any doubts on that score. That the Serbs attacked Dubrovnik, a city whose population is 95% Croat, is further proof that protecting Serbs was not the sole motivation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbs had no reasonable basis to fear a government that stressed its multiethnic character from the start.

It is bitterly ironic that the hard evidence is of *Serbian* mistreatment of the other nationalities. The Serbs have systematically killed and/or displaced Croats and Muslims in the areas they control. The Serbs have deprived the Albanians in Kossovo of civil and human rights. The Serbs have systematically destroyed mosques and Catholic churches.

5. In the last 300 years the Croats and the Serbs have waged war against each other only twice--now and during World War II.[3]

England, France and Germany have been at war with each other far more often than the Croats and the Serbs. Painting the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs as constantly warring primitives is inaccurate and racist. It is merely a rationalization for inaction.

6. The areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina occupied by the Serbs are not ethnically homogeneous.

The majority of Croatia's Serbs do not live in the so-called Krajina region. As a whole, the Krajina region had a mixed Croatian and Serbian population before the Croats were largely driven out.[4]

Similarly, the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina now occupied by the Serbs were originally a mixture of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The existence of Muslim "safe havens" deep within the so-called Bosnian Serb republic proves this point, as does the demolition of centuries-old mosques in Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb "capital."

---

[3] Of course, Croats and Serbs fought each other insofar as they were conscripts or volunteers in the armed forces of larger Empires in which they were incorporated. Decisions made by nondemocratic, imperialist powers, however, cannot reasonably be ascribed to their subject peoples.

[4] J. Kraljic, "Belgrade's Strategic Designs on Croatia," Croatian Democracy Project Special Report (1991).

Allowing the Serbs to retain the areas they seized through force in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a ratification of ethnic-cleansing. It is not simply a question of Serbian *control* of these regions but of the *elimination* of the non-Serbian peoples in them.

7. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is more precisely understood as the defense of the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina by its legitimate, multiethnic government against an attempt by Serbia through its Bosnian Serb surrogates to annex all or part of it.

The Bosnian Croat and Muslim peoples voted overwhelmingly for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. The alliance between the Croats and Muslims broke down when the international community refused to protect the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and proposed plans for the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines. Extremists of both the Croat and Muslim communities seized on this "every person for him/herself" philosophy and began to fight each other.

With the increased engagement of the U.S. in the former Yugoslavia, the Croat-Muslim alliance has not only been repaired but it has flowered into a federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a confederation between that state and Croatia. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is open also to a federation arrangement to include the Bosnian Serbs.[5]

The Bosnian Serbs could not retain the territory they have seized without the armaments given them by the former "Yugoslav" army and without constant supply of fuel and spare parts from Serbia. This is why maintaining the Brcko corridor is so important for them.

8. Serbia's systematic policy of conquest and ethnic-cleansing has no equal on the Croatian and Bosnian side.

The actions of the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are in stark contrast overall to the policies of armed conquest and systematic ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Milosevic regime.

The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is avowedly multiethnic and it has no designs on the territory of any other state. Atrocities committed by Muslim forces have been infrequent, isolated incidents, not state policy.

Croatia's law on ethnic minorities effectively guarantees the Serbs in Croatia participation in government. The majority of

---

[5] If this takes place, the confederation agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will have to be reexamined.

Serbs in Croatia--those outside the Serb-occupied territories--enjoy the same civil and human rights as Croats. Croatia has no forces on the territory of Serbia and has no designs on Serbia, despite the mistreatment of the Croatian minority in Vojvodina. Croatia's interest in protecting the Croatian minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been peacefully resolved within the framework of the federation/confederation agreement. As with the Muslims, atrocities committed by Croatian forces have been infrequent, isolated incidents, not state policy.

9. The economic incentives to create a Great Serbia are obvious.

Serbia's incentive to incorporate Bosnia-Herzegovina and most of Croatia into Great Serbia is obvious. Serbia was one of the poorer republics in the former Yugoslavia. Its socialist economy produced such engineering "marvels" as the Yugo automobile, and it enjoyed the economic fruits of the vast Yugoslav bureaucracy in Belgrade--now lost to it. Serbia itself has no seaport. Although it controls the port of Bar in Montenegro, transport between Bar and Belgrade is expensive because of the mountains in between.

Croatia, by contrast, has an excellent economic base. In the former Yugoslavia it was the second wealthiest republic. Virtually the entire Adriatic seacoast with its ports and tourist industry belong to Croatia. Croatia has excellent farmland in Slavonia, which has has oil resources as well.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is rich in mineral resources and provides the avenues to Slavonia and the Croatian coast.

10. Neither the Croatian government nor the Croatian people is fascist.

The current Croatian government was democratically elected. There is a lively opposition as proved by the recent split in the ruling party. Although not perfect, Croatia's record regarding a free press and privatization compares favorably with that of other newly independent countries of central and eastern Europe, especially if adjustments are made to account for the war and the massive refugee population that Croatia sustains.

Croatian President Tudjman was a general in the anti-fascist movement during World War II. He has not been a member of the Communist Party since the 1970's.

The checkerboard shield of the Republic of Croatia is not a fascist symbol. It dates from the Middle Ages, and it was used by the Socialist Federal Republic of Croatia. As an historical symbol, it was coopted by the Nazi collaborationist state of Croatia during World War II as was the German cross by the Nazis. The German cross is still in use by the German military. The

actual Croatian fascist symbol is a "U" (for Ustasha) as the swastika was for the Nazis.

The Nazi puppet state of Croatia during World War II was not voted in by the Croatian people but was the result of the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia. A Nazi collaborationist regime was also installed in Serbia, headed by Serbian General Nedic.

The leader of the anti-fascist forces, Josip Broz Tito, was Croatian, and Croats made up the largest ethnic group of his Partisan Movement in its early stages. As the Partisans became more successful and achieved legitimacy through Allied recognition, it attracted other ethnic groups in larger numbers.

11. The borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are based on historical and ethnic realties.

The borders of the Republic of Croatia encompass most of the Croatian population of the former Yugoslavia with only a small admixture of non-Croatian elements (mostly Serbian).[6] These borders also correspond to the historic Croatian political entities of Central Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. At one time these political divisions were united in the triune kingdom of Croatia. These political divisions continued to be recognized in the Austro-Hungarian Empire up to 1918. They also were the basis for the County of Croatia within inter-war Yugoslavia.

The Republic of Serbia, by contrast, is only approximately 67% Serbian because of the large minority populations in Vojvodina and Kossovo.[7] Central Serbia and Kossovo were Serbian at least from the Middle Ages. Vojvodina, however, was incorporated into Serbia only after 1918. Montenegro, of course, was an independent kingdom separate from Serbia in 1918. The Sandjak area of Serbia and Montenegro has had a separate political history also.

Bosnia-Herzegovina's boundaries were generally established in the Middle Ages. It was a distinct political division under the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not claim to be a national state but rather a multiethnic one.

12. Neither Croatia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina has asked for massive foreign ground troops.

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would be capable of recapturing their territory themselves if the unjust arms embargo were lifted and if the international community leveled the playing field by

---

[6] Approximately 75% of the population of Croatia is Croat. Washington Times, Nov. 25, 1991.

[7] Washington Times, Nov. 25, 1991.

providing air support.

13. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is distinguishable from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. It is similar to Kuwait.

One of the principal justifications for the Persian Gulf War was Iraq's violation of international borders by its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have internationally recognized borders, and they are both full-fledged members of the United Nations. Serbia has violated those borders, using its own troops and those of its surrogates. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda.

Both Croatia and Bosnia have functioning, democratically elected governments. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. (Indeed, Kuwait was not even a democracy when it was defended by the U.S. and its allies.)

Given limited military support, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are capable of retaking their territories. This is not the case in Somalia, Haiti, or Rwanda.

II. Resolve

The essential precondition for resolute action regarding former Yugoslavia is abandonment of the fantasy that no party is to blame. As the above points prove, there is no doubt that Serbia is the aggressor and that Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Albanian people of Kossovo are the victims. Once this clarity is achieved, there are essentially two choices.

The first choice is attractive but morally bankrupt. It also depends on Serbian rationality. Essentially, it will allow the Serbs to retain the territories that they have forcibly seized and to finish the job of ethnically purifying them.

Supposedly, the Serbs will be deterred from gobbling up more of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina through limited air strikes. The hope is that in exchange for lifting the economic sanctions against Serbia, Milosevic will pressure the rebel Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reach a peaceful accommodation with Zagreb and Sarajevo. This accommodation is supposed to result in reintegrating the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia with Croatia along with guarantees of autonomy and international supervision of human rights. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, reintegration of the Serb-held areas into a federal Bosnia is also hoped for. The next best scenario calls for the Bosnian Serbs to yield 20% of their conquered territory with the remainder annexed to Serbia to create a Great Serbia.

The more likely result is that the Serbs will retain what they

have conquered in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and annex it to Serbia. Under pressure from the Danubian states, the sanctions will be gradually lifted de facto. They will quietly be forgotten by the rest of the world. Witness the rush to do business in China after Tienanmen Square.

It is also possible that the Serbs will call the world's bluff and expand their holdings in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Does the U.S. and its allies have the stomach to prevent the fall of the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia?

The second choice is harder, but as it is based on justice, it has a better chance of resulting in lasting peace. This plan calls for lifting the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and providing them with the equipment to retake the occupied territories. (U. N. peacekeepers would be deployed in the liberated territories to prevent vengeance.) It also envisions air support from the U.S. and its allies. This air support would not only assist Croatian and Bosnian offensives but would also destroy the Bosnian and Croatian Serb air forces. The target of the first offensive would be to cut the Brcko corridor and link up the Croatian and Bosnian forces. Without this essential corridor, the rebel Serbs in Croatia and western Bosnia cannot survive. If Serbia intervenes, the air war must be taken to Serbia proper through bombing of strategic bridges, arms factories, and utilities. The economic sanctions on Serbia, of course, will be retained.

Only the second choice scenario has a realistic chance of bringing the Serbs to the bargaining table to negotiate in good faith. As has been proved time and time again, the only thing the Serbs understand is the credible threat of force. Regrettably, this is the only way to bring lasting peace to the region.

Biography

National Federation of Croatian Americans

Edward J. Damich
President

Professor Edward Damich brings over a quarter-century of experience as a law professor, government official and foreign policy expert to the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA). Elected unanimously as the NFCA's first President on January 22, 1994, Professor Damich leads over 2.5 million Croatian Americans in their support for peace and democracy in the Balkans. The NFCA is composed of 24 Croatian-American organizations including the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Croatian Catholic Union, the Croatian National Association and Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities.

Professor Damich currently holds the position of Professor of Law at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia, where he has taught courses on intellectual property and legal philosophy since 1984. In 1992, President Bush appointed Professor Damich to serve as a Commissioner of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. In this capacity Professor Damich acted as the highest ranking Croatian American in the Bush Administration. He has also worked as Research Director at The Heritage Foundation, a Washington D.C.-based think-tank, and Associate Professor of Law at the Delaware Law School.

In addition to his professional activities, Professor Damich frequently lectures on the former Yugoslavia and international relations and has written numerous journal and newspaper articles on these subjects. Most recently he participated in panel discussions on the Balkan conflict at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C.

Professor Damich has travelled extensively in the Balkans and has many close relatives living in Croatia. He holds a J.D. from Catholic University in Washington, D.C. and J.S.D. and L.L.M. degrees from Columbia University in New York.

###

To arrange interviews or comment contact:
Sanda Pecina, National Coordinator
NFCA
202.331.2830

Fact Sheet

National Federation of Croatian Americans

A Brief Summary

The National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA) is the only representative Croatian-American umbrella organization in the United States. The NFCA is composed of the 24 largest Croatian-American organizations in the country speaking on behalf of over 2.5 million Americans of Croatian descent.

The NFCA is dedicated to promoting an independent, democratic and free market Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in which all peoples will be guaranteed their human and civil rights.

The NFCA was formed in January 1994 at a meeting in St. Louis, Missouri of representatives of all of the major Croatian-American organizations. The structure of the NFCA assures that it will be representative of the national Croatian-American community. The NFCA is governed by an Assembly of Delegates, which consists of representatives from each member organization. The Assembly of Delegates elects a Regional Board of Directors composed of seven Directors from the East, Central and Western regions of the United States. The Regional Board elects the Executive Committee which is responsible for the day to day operations of the NFCA.

The goals and objectives of the Federation include:

- speaking out on issues that affect the Croatian people both here and abroad,
- issuing white papers and position papers on a range of issues,
- facilitating communication, cooperation and coordination among its various member organizations,
- assembling a resource bank of Croatian Americans,
- mobilizing the Croatian-American community for effective political action.

NFCA Fact Sheet

The NFCA's Executive Committee includes representatives of the largest and most prominent Croatian-American organizations. Mr. Joseph Brigich, Vice President of the Croatian Fraternal Union is Eastern Regional Vice President; the Rev. Anthony Petrusic, President of the Croatian Catholic Union is Central Regional Vice President; Mr. Leo Majich, President of the Croatian National Association is Western Regional Vice President, and Dr. Zdenka Delalic, President of the Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities (AMAC-Mid-Atlantic) is Secretary. In addition, the Executive Committee includes well-known Croatian-American activists Edward J. Damich, a Professor of Law at George Mason University who serves as President, and Steve Rukavina, who serves as Treasurer. Ms. Sanda Pecina serves as National Coordinator in the Federation's Washington, D.C. headquarters.

Member organizations represented by the NFCA include: the American Croatian Relief Project, American Initiative for Croatia, AMAC-Capital, AMAC-Mid-Atlantic, AMAC-Midwest, AMAC-Rudjer-Boskovic, Croatian-American Goodwill Association (AZ), Croatian American Political Club, Croatian Catholic Union, Croatian Council (Kansas City), Croatian Council (New York), Croatian Cultural Society (Omaha), Croatian Cultural Society (Minnesota), Croatian Fraternal Union, Croatian Fraternal Lodge #1836, Croatian Fraternal Lodge #1976, Croatian Philatelic Society, Croatian Relief Project (Kansas City), Croatian National Association, Eastern Virginia Croatian Club, Federation of Croatian Societies (Milwaukee), St. Joseph's Croatian Catholic Church, Croatian American Club-San Pedro and Truth About Croatia, Inc.

In addition to continuing the dissemination of information about current events in the Balkans, the NFCA's program for the next several months includes: 1) joint activities with groups supportive of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2) providing spokespersons for forums on Balkan issues, and 3) hosting events recognizing Members of Congress who have been supportive of a just and lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia.

In all of its activities, the NFCA promotes the views of the progressive mainstream of the Croatian-American community.

For further information contact:
Sanda Pecina, National Coordinator
NFCA
202.331.2830

Jason Miko, Account Executive
Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs
202.466.7800

# # #

OPENING STATEMENT
THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA AND THE BALKANS
MAY 11, 1994

Mr. Chairman, while the world stands by virtually impotent, we have been forced to watch the most tragic events on the continent of Europe since the Nazi atrocities of the Second World War. No nation or leader, including the President of the United States, has had the courage to lead the world community in addressing the problems which face the people of Bosnia immediately and which threaten to engulf the entire Balkan region.

Many members of the Committee, many members of the House of Representatives, have visited areas of the former Yugoslavia over the last few years. We have experienced first hand the suffering of the people. We have heard their cries for help. But the world stands by and watches as entire cities are destroyed. We do little, if anything, as we are presented with evidence of genocide, torture, rape and wanton killing. For over two years there has been a complete disregard for the lives and dignity of the people of this region.

Initial responses to the crisis attempted multilateral approaches through the United Nations. It was thought that an arms and trade embargo would deter an escalation of the crisis. All this did was enable the Serbs to control the power base left after the break up of the nation and prevented the Bosnian Muslims from defending their cities, their homes and their lives. Some nations did not support the U.N. imposed embargo and allowed the free flow of goods and services into Serbia while at the same time Serbian-backed forces were denying the shipment of humanitarian aid into the devastated cities and towns of Bosnia.

Entire populations were forced from their homes and into refugee camps. Those who remained in besieged cities were often without water, electricity and food. All communication was cut off. Only those who had access to short-wave or ham radios had any contact with the rest of the world.

Each new wave of terror was said to be a wake up call to the nations of the world to stop the horrors. But unfortunately, and to the shame of the nations of the world, the destruction has gone on.

The Clinton Administration continues to use the same, ineffective argument that nothing can be done without multilateral support and that the U.S. cannot act alone in addressing the crisis. But without leadership there will be no effective multilateral actions. I agree that we must work in cooperation with the international community, but when that community is paralyzed into inaction, effective and decisive leadership is needed--leadership that is lacking at this moment.

Like many others, I am concerned that there be an appropriate response from the U.S. I, like many others, have called on the Administration to provide leadership in responding to the crisis, to articulate U.S. policy, and to take effective measures to stop the bloodshed and destruction in Bosnia. Lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians would give them the means necessary to defend themselves; following through consistently on threatened air-strikes when the Serb forces blatantly disregard the warnings of NATO security forces; not only creating but protecting the safe havens; are only some of the measures that have been proposed--and supported--by the House of Representatives. But these measures go unused.

Not only has the Administration not provided decisive leadership regarding the crisis in Bosnia, some even argue that the U.S. has no vital interest in this area. Materially, that may be true. But Americans have an extremely vital interest in Bosnia. We are vitally interested in life, we are vitally interested in human dignity, we are vitally interested in peace and we are vitally interested in security. And if we doubt that the American people are not vitally interested in these we need only look at the Americans who have responded to the crisis and who are now in Bosnia.

American wives and mothers have formed an army of people who are right now on the ground in Bosnia, working among the Muslims, Christians and Jews; Serbs, Bosnians and Croats whose lives are being destroyed by the war. They are providing humanitarian aid, bring food, clothing and medical supplies. They are taking in doctors, nurses, clergy of all denominations, and social workers to meet the physical, spiritual and social needs of the people. But most of all they offer themselves--wives and mothers who heard the cries of the suffering people--and they have taken decisive action in the face of tragedy. Two examples of the responses of Americans to the crisis in Bosnia should be mentioned--"Mary's Hands" and "The Mother's Love Foundation." The women of these organizations risk their lives so that they can respond to the crisis in Bosnia. They offer not only assistance but hope--hope that the people of the world have not forgotten the suffering people of Bosnia.

The people of the world have not forgotten. Nor have they forgotten how to respond when others are suffering. But it seems that world leaders have forgotten, or, even worse, they choose to ignore it. It seems that the Administration has abandoned America's vital interest in human life, human dignity, peace and security. Each day we fail to respond to the crisis more people are suffering and dying.

The Administration seems to lack a clear policy in this crisis and it lacks determined leadership. I look forward to the testimony of our guests today. I hope their expert experience in this area will enable us to work toward a clear policy in regard to Bosnia and the Balkans and to effective actions which will bring an end to the suffering and genocide of the people of the Balkans.

CROATIAN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

STATEMENT OF THE CROATIAN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
for the meeting on
"U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia and the Balkans"

Wednesday, May 11, 1994

The Croatian American Association (CAA) protests the inclusion of Mr. Michael Djordjevich and Mr. Vladimir Matic as witnesses at the open meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on "U.S. policy towards Bosnia and the Balkans." It is outrageous that two Serbian representatives have been invited to speak at this foreign policy meeting on Bosnia and the Balkans, while no Croatian, Bosnian, Albanian, or Macedonian representatives were initially invited. It is also distressing that it took a major effort by the the Croatian American community of phone calls and letters to the Foreign Affairs Committee to change the witness list to include a Croat representative.

It is unacceptable for a committee of the U.S. Congress to provide Mr. Djordjevich and Mr. Matic with a platform from which to legitimize Serb occupation of neighboring countries.

The CAA expects Mr. Djordjevich and Mr. Matic to make an argument for lifting the economic sanctions on Serbia and to attempt to distance the Milosevic regime from the war crimes and genocide committed in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In fact, the only effective leverage against Serb aggression has been the economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, in conjunction with the threat of air strikes and the threat of lifting the arms embargo. The two Serbian witnesses will undoubtedly label the conflict as a "civil war," which it is not. The witnesses will also attempt to claim that all sides are equally guilty of war crimes.

In fact, Serbia started this war and has perpetrated the aggression for three years. Serbs are responsible for the overwhelming majority of war crimes. There are only two sides in this war: the Serbian aggressor and the Croat and Muslim victims.

A Pattern of Serbian Propaganda

According to a Roy Gutman Newsday article[1] and a publication of the Serbian American Media Center[2], former UN commander of Bosnia General Lewis MacKenzie was paid $15,000. by SERBNET (Serbian American National Information Network) to make two organized media tours which included: 1) testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 2) meetings with influential congressmen, 3) a speech at the Conservative Heritage Foundation, and 4) numerous newspaper interviews and television appearances. During these meetings and appearances, MacKenzie argued that all parties in the Balkan war are to blame for atrocities. "That view puts Mackenzie at odds with reports by the UN, the United States and international human rights groups that have found the Serbs primarily responsible for the ethnic cleansing and mass killings."[3]

Today's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Mr. Djordjevich and Mr. Matic is equivalent to MacKenzie's orchestrated appearance before the House Armed Services Committee.

The Serbian Unity Congress

The Serbian Unity Congress, of which witness Michael Djordjevich is a key board member, is an integral part of the Serbian American lobby and its powerful propaganda machine. According to the introductory issue of the Serbian Unity Congress, "The goals of the Serbian Unity Congress can be summarized as follows. The S.U.C.'s short term goal as adopted at the New York convention is to get the sanctions [against Serbia] lifted. The long term goal is to contribute to the **reconstruction of the territories on which the Serbian people find themselves** [emphasis ours]."[4] This is a very dangerous idea.

The Serbian Unity Congress has set up a series of programs and offices which include a "sanctions program" and the "Serbian Woman's Caucus program." The objective of these programs is to turn public opinion in favor of lifting economic sanctions on Serbia. The specific targets of this agenda are the media, the public and "decision makers."

Political Attitudes in Serbia

An April 1994 Radio Free Europe issue published a survey conducted in Serbia under the auspices of Belgrade University.[5] Following are the results of the survey:

1) President Slobodan Milosevic "emerged as the most trusted politician in Serbia" and the most favorable politician among the respondents.

2) "A significant percentage of the respondents supported policies and ideas that could result in the creation of a Greater Serbia."

a) Seventy percent of the respondents said that the Bosnian Serbs should keep all or most of the conquered territories in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

b) Sixty-nine percent of the respondents want to retain the current "police state" status of Kosovo, whose autonomy was stripped by Milosevic in 1989.

3) The survey data indicate that the public has succumbed to Milosevic's propaganda and accepts his interpretation for the sanctions imposed on the rump Yugoslavia and his country's economic collapse.

All Serbian political parties and leading political figures share a common goal: Greater Serbia. This includes Milosevic, Vojislav Seselj (Serbian Radical Party), Zeljko Raznatovic (alias Arkan, leader of the paramilitary group "The Tigers" and member of the Serbian Unity Party), and Vuk Draskovic (leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia). On December 15, 1993, Draskovic, the leading opposition figure in Serbia, identified himself on a Studio B TV program as "a Serbian nationalist and an advocate of the idea of an enlarged Serbian state, or a Greater Serbia."[6]

Serbia is still providing arms to Serbs in Bosnia in the campaign for a Greater Serbia. At this very moment, the Serbs are massing troops around Brcko and on Mt. Igman in flagrant violation of the NATO ultimatum. Allowing Serbian Americans such as Mr. Djordjevich and Mr. Matic to testify before the Committee on Foreign Affairs only furthers this Serbian agenda. Since they began their aggression on Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbs have constantly lied and have never lived up to any of their commitments.

References

[1]Roy Gutman and Dele Olojede, "Serbs Bankroll Speeches By Ex-UN Commander," Newsday, June 22, 1993.
[2]"SERBNET Media Watch," A publication of the Serbian American Media Center, Vol.1, No. 5, May 1993.
[3]Gutman and Olojede
[4]"Introductory Issue," Serbian Unity Congress, No. 42, 12/26/93.
[5]Stan Markovich and Patricia Moy, "Political Attitudes in Serbia," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3. No. 15, April 15, 1994, pp.33-36.
[6]Markovich and Moy, p.34.

APPENDIX

DIOCESE OF SAN FRANCISCO

ΙΕΡΑ ΑΡΧΙΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΗ ΒΟΡΕΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΤΙΟΥ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗΣ
GREEK ORTHODOX ARCHDIOCESE OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

372 SANTA CLARA AVENUE SAN FRANCISCO CA 94127 (415) 753 3075 FAX (415) 753-2265

April 20, 1994

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr President,

As a patriotic American who has closely followed American foreign policy in the Balkans, I was deeply disturbed by your news conference today at which you indicated that America through the U.N. will be pursuing an even more aggressive policy toward Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. To one knowledgable in the history of the Balkans it is clear that our foreign policy in this region has not taken into account the long and bitter ethnic strife that has consumed the Balkans during the last millenium. Perhaps as Americans we fail to appreciate the kind of all-consuming nationalism that characterizes the Balkans and believe that by heightening aggression we will eventually bring the Serbs to their knees. Wasn't this precisely the error of our foreign policy in Vietnam? I am suprised to see that you, as an American who grew up during that horrible war, would want to involve the United States in another hopeless conflict.

Any proposed solution to the situation in the former Yugoslavia which will require Serbs to live in a state dominated by Muslims and Croats is doomed to failure. Even the Nazis failed to completely pacify Serbia. How then do we, with air strikes and "peace keeping" forces, propose to do so? The Balkans are not the Persian Gulf. The inevitable long and drawn-out parade of dead Americans that will follow from the policy of ever-increasing escalation will only exhaust the American people and cause us to once again to "declare victory and leave."

It is widely reported in the news media that you postponed your news conference until you were able to ensure that Yeltsin was "on board." Since the love of the Russian people for the Serbs is well known, what can be accomplished by driving a wedge between Yeltsin and the people of Russia? By obliging Yeltsin, for the favor of the West, to follow this senseless policy we endanger his already weakened government and give credence to the ultra-nationalists. Certainly our eagerness to pursue a united front with Russia should not fail to take into account the extremely fragile domestic situation there: a situation which

could have grave consequences for the United States if the ultra-nationalists were to gain more power.

Thus, as a Greek-American with more than a passing interest in the Balkans, I implore you to re-examine your administration's policy as regards this region. The situation there cannot be reduced to the "good guys and the bad guys." Everyone has blood on their hands. Solutions must be sought that avoid creating pseudo-states to which no-one can bear allegiance. Tito, who created the artificial borders that we are now so vigorously defending, must be laughing in his grave at his final triumph over the West.

Praying that the Lord will guide you in pursuing a just and peaceful policy toward the Balkans, I remain,

Respectfully,

+Bishop Anthony

A SUMMARY REPORT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP

PALE, MARCH 19 & 20, 1994

by

MICHAEL DJORDJEVICH
ZARKO G. BILBIJA, Ph.D.
MOMCILO K. TASICH

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05903 775 2

I

INTRODUCTION

On March 4, 1994, we received an invitation from the President of the Republica Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to visit Pale, Bosnia. As stated in the invitation, he and his associates wanted to gain the perspectives and insights of Americans of Serbian ancestry on the eve of "the current and most critical phase of negotiations" relative to peace in Bosnia. Copy of Dr. Karadzic's invitation is attached.

As a result of the invitation, we spent some 24 hours in Pale, Bosnia. In addition to Dr. Karadzic, who was with us during all the discussions, we also met two of his Vice Presidents, Dr. Koljevic and Mr. Krajisnik and the Prime Minister, Mr. Lukic. We had some twelve hours of intensive and far-ranging discussions in regard to the war, the forthcoming peace process and the reconstruction of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. These exchanges were candid, and our views were genuinely sought and regarded.

II

THE FORTHCOMING PEACE PROCESS

The highlights are:

Our strongest overall impression is that the Serbs in Bosnia desire peace but without surrender.

President Karadzic and his cabinet are well aware that "no party to the conflict can get everything it wants"; peace demands compromise and concessions by all parties. If the Conference proceeds in this spirit, President Karadzic told us that he is highly optimistic about the final outcome.

The Serbs have formed a functional state. Before the war, it was pointed out to us, they owned 64% of the land and now they control 72%. They are willing, however, to go below even 64% to achieve peace - as long as they have a viable state.

Apparently, the wounds of war are deep, and President Karadzic and his associates strongly stated that "we cannot live together with the Muslims: we want to live in our own state."

Therefore, he further stated, "we are convinced that appropriate borders must be drawn now." There seems to be a willingness to be flexible as to how this new Serbian entity would relate to the newly-formed Muslim-Croat federation, the Republic of Croatia, and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They see this as a process and seem to be amicable to establishing appropriate relationships (including confederal) with any of these states, providing that their own security is preserved and strengthened. "We do not want any more wars," President Karadzic said.

The key point of interest to us was President Karadzic's belief that no large number of peacekeeping troops would be needed. The Bosnian Serbs' viewpoint is that: (a) The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be made responsible for facilitating the transition to peace with their own troops; and (b) The United Nations would supervise and monitor this process by means of a limited number of observers. Asked if these troops could be put under the UN flag, Karadzic expressed confidence that Milosevic would accept it.

It was apparent to us that the Bosnian Serbs are adamant about creating a second city from those segments of Sarajevo where they have a clear majority. "Before the war, Sarajevo was the largest Serbian city after Belgrade," said President Karadzic. (Of Sarajevo's 580,000 inhabitants, 300,000 were Muslims and 200,000 were Serbs.) Two points stood out in our conversation: (a) they have no place to transfer these Serb residents of Sarajevo; and (b) an "ethnically cleansed Sarajevo would become a gateway of aggressive Islamic fundamentalism to Europe." As an example of the Muslim's intent to turn Sarajevo into a "fundamentalist fortress," we were given a page from a recent (March 12, 1994) issue of the official Muslim newspaper "Oslobodjenje" which announces the renaming of city streets in order to eliminate all traces of Western culture and former associations (e.g., the Square of William Shakespeare is to become the Square of Military Doctors, and the Street of Leo Tolstoy is to become the Street of Mohammed Muradbegovic). Also, we were told that the Arabic language had been introduced in schools in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian Serb leadership is gravely concerned: (a) that the just signed agreement between the Muslims and Croats is based on expediency; (b) that it will not last; and (c) that when it unravels, it may reinvolve the Serbs in a new cycle of war. Although they did not say it, they hinted at seeking some international guarantees that would protect them from the above outcome. Dr. Koljevic maintained that Zagreb had not understood the depth and strength of feelings in the Croatian part of Herzegovina relative to having their own national state or joining Croatia.

It quickly became obvious to us that the Bosnian Serbs have a set of minimal requirements -- the proverbial bottom line. If pushed to go beyond those, the peace process would break down.

Apparently, there is so much resistance by the people, by the military and by the "Skupstina" (the Serb Parliament) that no leader can secure a peace settlement without meeting these minimal expectations. Otherwise, our fear is that the new treaty would suffer the same fate as the ill-fated Vance-Owen Plan.

We detected yet another serious impediment to ending this tragic war: ours and the E.C's vindictive approach to the pending peace process. On more than one occasion, we were, in effect, told that due to its wrongful actions, the West also bears a heavy responsibility for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the ensuing carnage. "We did not start the war, while we suffered tremendous losses and have more than half a million of our people displaced." We were told more than once by Karadzic and his associates, "the U.S. and the E.C. have placed practically all the blame on us."

We venture to conclude that Karadzic and his top aides seem to be realistic about the Russians and their role. Serbo-Russian relations are obviously more determined at this time by our own actions than some planned or desired endeavors by the Serbs. Is our foreign policy pushing the Serbs into the Russian bear's embrace against their will?

Finally, the Bosnian Serbs gave us clear indications that they realize that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats will always be their neighbors, and that their common interest is to live in peace and cooperation once the appropriate borders are drawn and honored by all parties.

Momcilo Tasich — Zarko Bilbija — Michael Djordjevich

ISBN 0-16-044489-6

90000

9 780160 444890